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offense concluded against the statute, State v. Jim, supra, dictum. If,
however, the indictment concluded both at common law and against
the statute and the offense was a common law offense the conclusion
"against the form of the statute" was rejected as surplusage. State
v. Lamb, 65 N. C. 420 (1871), State v. Bryson, 79 N. C. 652
(1878), State v. Harris, 106 N. C. 682 (1890), State v. Craft, 168
N. C. 208 (1914).
(2) In 1854 the revised code, c. 35 §20 provided that "no judg-
ment upon an indictment ... shall be staid or reversed ... for the
insertion of the words against the form of the statutes instead of the
words against the form of the statute or vice versa nor for omission
of the words against the form of the statute or against the form of
the statutes. N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §4625. In State v.
Kirknzan, 104 N. C. 911 (1889) these words were declared unnec-
cessary in the indictment and in State v. Peters, 107 N. C. 876 (1890)
they were rejected as surplusage.
III. It is apparent that the above section is a codification of our
law.
ALBERT COATES.
Chapel Hill, N. C.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Air Law-Liability for Injuries by Aircraft
Eight modem cases involving either actual or threatened injury to
persons or property from aircraft have been noted in this country.'
Two were cases of criminal trespass. 2 In both, the charge was dis-
missed because no statute applied. Four were cases in which dam-
ages were asked. In one of these, a dirigible flying below five hun-
dred feet frightened a team, causing it to run away and to injure the
' For bibliographies on the field of Air Law, consult: Hirschberg, Bibliog-
raphy of the Law of Aviation (1929) 2 So. CALF. L. REv. 455; and Hotchkiss,
Select Bibliography of Air Law (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 264.
'Unreported case in Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania, comment in (1922) 2
Wis. L. REv. 58; Commonwealth v. Nevin and Smith, Court of Quarter Ses-
sions of Jefferson County, Pennsylvania, April 1922 (unreported), comment
in (1922) 71 U. OF PA. L. REv. 88.
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plaintiff. Recovery was allowed.3  In two cases, fair boards had
engaged aviators t6 exhibit at fairs and spectators were injured. The
Wisconsin court refused to allow recovery because the board was
exercising governmental functions. It indicated, too, that in a proper
case it would require proof of negligence. 4 In the New York case,
the board was held liable under local statutes because it failed to
provide a safe place for spectators. 5 In the fourth case, defendant's
plane fell on the plaintiff's lawn. The Minnesota court allowed
damages and, though refusing a permanent injunction against flight
at any altitude, granted a temporary injunction restraining flights at
altitudes lower than prescribed by the local flight statute. 6 In the
last two of the eight cases under review, plaintiffs, owners of country
estates adjoining airports, sought injunctions against flight over their
land at less than the statutory standard of five hundred feet. The
Massachusetts court found such flights to constitute trespass but
failed to find sufficient damage to sustain an injunction. 7 The federal
court, however, granted an injunction against flights below this alti-
tude, even though made in taking off and landing.8
Though decisions in this field are few, statutory provisions are
numerous. In the two fair-board cases, cited above, the courts indi-
cated that recovery must depend upon the plaintiff's ability to prove
negligence.9 The difficulty of doing this in the case of aircraft is
obvious.' 0 Therefore, at least seventeen states, including North
Carolina, have made owners and operators of aircraft absolutely
liable for any damage caused while in flight."L Although these
'Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 35 F. (2d) 761 (N. D.
Ohio 1929); (1930) 8 N. C. L. REv. 281; (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 633;
(1930) 43 H~av. L. Rv. 837; (1930) 28 MIcH. L. REv. 756.
" Morrison v. Fisher, 160 Wis. 621, 152 N. W. 475 (1915).
'Platt v. Erie Co. Agricultural Society, 164 App. Div. 99, 149 N. Y. Supp.
520 (1914).
'Johnson v. Curtiss Northwest Airplane Co., district court of Ramsey
County, Minnesota (1923), reported in 1928 UNirm STATES AVIATION RE-
virw 42.
Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 170 N. E. 385 (Mass. 1930) ; (1930)
16 VA. L. REv. 714.
'Swetland v. Airport Co., 41 F. (2d) 929 (N. D. Ohio 1930).
'Supra, note 2.
"
0LOGAN, AxracRAF LAW MADE PLAIN (1928), 44.
"Seventeen states: Vermont, Delaware, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Michigan,
Rhode Island, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Nevada, Tennessee, Ari-
zona, North Carolina, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Wisconsin; UNIFORM
AFRONAUTICS AcT, §5; N. C. PuB. LAvs (1929), c. 190, §8.5; N. C. ANN.
CODE (Michie, Supp. 1929), §191 (n) (Provision makes owner and operator
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statutes do not regulate noise and, in the last case stated the court
refused an injunction against an airport on the grounds that there
was no unnecessary noise, a constant and unnecessary disturbance
will probably be dealt with by the courts as a nuisance. 12
The most frequent cause of litigation is low flight of aircraft. 18
Under statutory flight rules, it is unlawful to fly at less than five
hundred feet, except while taking off and landing.14 The courts in
the Massachusetts and Ohio cases, however, go a step farther and
hold that, even while taking off and landing, actual interference with
the use of land -below will be regarded as trespass.r This means
that planes must reach the five hundred foot. level before passing
from the airport over adjoining land, 16 or, in other words, that about
three thousand five hundred feet be added to each dimension of the
present average airport.' 7
G. A. LONG.
of every aircraft absolutely liable for injuries to person or property caused by
the ascent, descent, or flight of aircraft or dropping of any object therefrom
unless injury is caused in whole or in part 'by negligence of person injured or
owner of property injured). See also c. 90, §§3 and 4; N. C. ANN. CODE(Michie, Supp. 1929) §191 (aa, bb) (operation of aircraft while intoxicated
made a crime).
1LoGAN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 24.
'It must be noticed that the courts have refused to rule that any flight
above another's land is trespass, although that would seem to be required by the
common-law maxim, cujus est solum ejus est urque ad caelin:. This ques-
tion has been settled in many states by statute. UNIFoRm AERONAUTICS AcT,
§3; N. C. PuB. LAWs (1929) c. 190, §3; N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, Supp.
1929), §191 (e) (Places the ownership of superincumbent space in the land-
bwner but subject to the right of flight). Caeluin actually means a space be-
ginning only a short distance above the earth. (1928) 62 Am. L. REv. 887.
But see criticism of this view by Bogert, Problems in Aviation Law (1920),
6. CORN. L. Q. 271. Wandsworth Bd. of Works v. United Telegraph Co.
(1889), L. R. 13 Q. B. Div. 904; Erickson v. Crookston, 100 Minn. 481, 111
N. W. 391 (1903).
144 STAT. 569 (1926), 49 U. S. C. A. §173 (1929) (Secretary of Commerce
given power to establish rules of aviation). Air Commerce Regulations,
Chap. 5, §81 (g). (Prohibits flights under five hundred feet, except in landing
or taking off.) In Swetland v. Airport Co., supra note 8, the court based its
decision on whether there was interference with effective possession where
flights occurred at less than five hundred feet.
"Supra notes 7 and 8. UNiFORm AERONAUTICS AcT, §4. N. C. Pun. LAWS
(1929), c. 190, §4. N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, Supp. 1929), §191 (m). (Pro-
viding that flights at such low altitude as to interfere with the then existing
use of the property or so conducted as to be imminently dangerous to any
person thereon is unlawful.)
(1930) 3 So. CAtjr. L. REv. 413, 415; 30 CoT L. REv., 579, 581.
' TIMm, Vol. 30, no. 5, at page 51; AmERiCAN CiTy, Vol. 43 at page 165.
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Constitutional Law-Power of Administrative Officer to
Revoke Driver's Permit-Personal Fitness as Test
In a recent Virginia case a portion of an ordinance authorizing
the chief of police to revoke the permit of any driver who "in his
opinion" becomes unfit to drive was held void, since it failed to lay
down any rule determining the fitness of the driver, and thereby
delegated a power of arbitrary discrimination to the officer.'
The broad principle covering this type of cases is that an ordi-
nance which vests arbitrary discrimination in an officer with respect
to the practicing of an ordinary lawful business without preserving a
uniform rule of action is unconstitutional. 2
The decisions are by no means uniform as to what constitutes a
sufficient rule of action. Any attempt to determine the sufficiency of
the rule by reference to the words employed will result in hopeless
confusion. However it has been held that when a general delegation
of the power of determination follows specific delegations on the
same subject the latter should be construed as limited to the field of
the former ;3 also if the courts decide that a more detailed rule would
tend to confuse rather than enlighten the officer, they will consider
this as a factor favoring the sufficiency of the rule as laid down.4
The courts themselves recognize the impracticability of reference to
the wording alone as a standard, especially where personal qualifica-
tions are involved. 5 As a result they tend to uphold a seemingly
arbitrary delegation of power to officials in this particular class of
cases.
A review of those cases construing 'personal fitness' ordinances
reveals that the courts resort to many factors outside the ordinance
itself in determining whether or not it lays down a sufficient rule of
action. There is a very apparent tendency to consider closely the
public interest to be subserved in the granting or refusal of a par-
ticular license. As the occupation or business approaches the border-
line of privilege wherein a license is fraught with danger to public
interest0 the courts uphold a wider range of discretion than when the
'Thompson v. Smith, Chief of Police, 154 S. E. 579 (Va. 1930).
SYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. ed. 220 (1886).
" Forman v. State Board of Health, 157 Ky. 123, 162 S. W. 796 (1914).
'Ex Pare Kreutzer, 187 Wis. 463, 204 N. W. 595 (1925).
'Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539, 37 Sup. Ct. 217, 61 L. ed. 480
(1916) ; Ex Parte Kreutzer, supra note 4.
' Bizzell v. Goldsboro, 192 N. C. 348, 357, 135 S. E. 50 (1926). (Clarkson,
J. distinguishes between those occupations or activities in which the "right"
to engage is a mere privilege and those activities in which the practitioner has
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occupation is purely a matter of private interest, subject to only a
limited degree of legislative restriction.7 It is submitted that the
present case was rightly decided since the individual has something in
the nature of a vested right to drive his private car.
One court, in considering whether or not a certain ordinance im-
posed an arbitrary power in an officer, considered, among other
factors, the hardship a refusal of the permit would impose on the
applicant.8
The tendency of the courts to become more liberal in the con-
struction of this type of statute can, to some extent, be attributed to
the growing complexity of our administrative government, necessitat-
ing a grant of greater discretionary powers to local authorities.9
WEX S. MALONE.
Constitutional Law-Taxation-Chain Store Tax
The recent case of The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company
et al. v. Maxwell' held valid under both state and federal Constitu-
tions a statute2 declaring every person, firm or corporation operating
or maintaining two or more stores or mercantile establishments under
the same general management, supervision, or ownership to be a
chain store operator per se, and as such subject to a license tax, for
the privilege of engaging in such business, of fifty dollars ($50.00)
on each and every store operated in the state in excess of one. The
a vested right) ; Brunswick-Balke Co. v. Mecklenburg Co., 181 N. C. 386, 107
S. E. 317 (1921) (Operation of billiard parlor held privilege).
"In the following cases ordinances laying down apparently arbitrary pow-
ers of discrimination were held valid: Sumner v. Ward, 126 Wash. 75, 217
Pac. 502 (1923) (peddlers) ; Minces v. Schoenig, 72 Minn. 528, 75 N. W. 711
(1898) (gift, fire, and bankrupt sales) ; State v. Cohen, 73 N. H. 543, 63 Atl.
928 (1906) (dealers in junk); Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183 (1900)
(sale of cigarettes) ; Clark v. McBride, 101 N. J. L. 213, 127 Atl. 550 (1925)
(employment agencies).8 Matthews v. Murphy, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 750, 63 S. W. 785, 786 (1901).
'Leach v. Daugherty, 73 Cal. App. 83, 238 Pac. 160 (1925); Ex parte
Kreutzer, supra note 4.
The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company et al v. Maxwell, Commis-
sioner of Revenue of North Carolina, 199 N. C. 433 (1930).
""Branch or Chain Stores. Every person, firm or corporation engaged in
the business of operating or maintaining in this State, under the same general
management, supervision, or ownership, two or more stores or mercantile
establishments, where goods, wares, and/or merchandise is sold or offered for
sale at retail shall be deemed a branch or chain store operator, shall apply for
and obtain from the Commissioner of Revenue a State license for the privilege
of engaging in such business of a branch or chain store operator, and shall
pay for such license fifty dollars ($50.00) on each and every store operated in
this State in excess of one." N. C. Pun. LAws (1929), c. 345, §162.
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statute obviously was passed to remedy the defects of the 1927 chain
store tax3 which was declared void in The Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Company v. Doughtonw The present statute differs from the
former one in that it is not retroactive, 5 and the classification is be-
tween operators of one store and operators of more than one store.
The right of the state to tax trades for the purpose of raising
revenue and to classify for the purpose of taxation is no longer
questioned. The only requirements under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment are that such classifications be reasonable and not arbitrary,
for the Amendment was not intended to compel the State to adopt
an iron rule of equal taxation. 6
Due to the campaign being waged in the press and over the radio
against chain stores, it is inevitable that various types of legislation
directed at chain stores will be passed.7 To date, with the exception
of North Carolina, only two such statutes have been before the courts.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky declared an Act requiring a "cash
and carry" grocery store to pay a higher tax than a regular service
grocery store to be unconstitutional on the basis that there was no
reasonable grounds for the distinction.8 The Federal District Court
recently held an Indiana Act taxing mercantile store operators by a
'"Branch or Chain Stores. That any person, firm, corporation, or asso-
ciation operating or maintaining within this State, under the same general
management, supervision or ownership, six or more stores or mercantile estab-
lishments, shall pay a license tax of $50.00 for each such store, or mercantile
establishment in the State, for the privilege of operating or maintaining such
store or mercantile establishments." N. C. PuB. LAws (1927), c. 80, §162.
"The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company et al. v. Doughton, Commis-
sioner of Revenue of North Carolina, 196 N. C. 145, 144 S. E. 701 (1928).
An excellent article dealing with this case and the chain store tax in general is
-Becker and Hess, The Chain Store License Tax and the Fourteenth Amend-
wnent (1929), 7 N. C. L. Rav. 115. Also commented on in (1929) 3 TEmPLE
L. Q. 322, and (1929) 7 TENN. L. Rav. 316.
Clarkson, J., concurring in Tea Co. v. Doughton, supra note 4: "The vice
of the license tax to my mind is in the fact that when the sixth store is taxed
it is retroactive, and not only is the sixth store taxed but the first five also."
'This question is fully discussed by Becker and Hess, op. cit. supra note 4.
Cases dealing with discrimination in license tax based on different methods used
in same kind of business annotated in Note (1926) 43 A. L. R. 592.
' In a recent address before the Kansas Retail Grocers Association, Gov-
ernor Theodore Christianson of Minnesota said that where ten years ago only
four per cent of the country's retail business was done by chain stores, today
more than twenty per cent of the total retail business was done by them. He
also said that there are now in America over 100,000 chain stores having annual
sales of more than $8,000,000,000. U. S. DAILY, Oct. 24, 1930 at 2587. Such a
radical change in the economic life of the nation will necessarily call for some
kind of regulatory legislation.
'City of Danville v. Quaker Maid, Inc., 211 Ky. 677, 278 S. W. 98, 43
A. L. R. 590 (1925).
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graduated scale based on the number of stores owned to be unconsti-
tutional.9 The judge in so holding said, "All persons engaged in the
operation of one or more stores or mercantile establishments within
the state of Indiana belong to the same class for occupational tax
purposes, as the plaintiff."
The North Carolina decision is opposed to the above holdings, but
it is submitted that the result is correct. The court recognizes as a
proper basis for classification the protection of the independent
merchant class.
MooRE BRYSON.
Criminal Law-Automobiles--Manslaughter-Failure to
Stop at Highway Intersection.
Defendant, in violation of a statute,' failed to stop before turning
into a highway from a side road. Just as his car straightened out in
the highway it was struck from the rear by a bus. The bus skidded,
turned over, and a passenger was killed. Defendant was charged
with manslaughter. The pavement was slippery with snow and ice,
and the defendant's car was first seen by the bus driver when it was
five or ten feet away. A person coming into the highway from the
side road could see to the left-the direction from which the bus
came-for a distance of 175 yards. Held, the purpose of the statute
is to allow motorists to gain a knowledge of conditions on the high-
way. Since the defendant already had such knowledge, the purpose
of the statute had been accomplished, and there was no proximate
'Jackson v. State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana et al., 38 F. (2d)
652 (S. D. Ind. 1930). AcTs IND. 1929, c. 207, §5, (The validity of the
classification in such section being the main question of the case.) is as fol-
lows: "Every person, firm, corporation, association, or copartnership opening,
establishing, operating or maintaining one or more stores or mercantile estab-
lishments, within this state, under the same general management, supervision,
or ownership, shall pay the license fees hereinafter prescribed for the privilege
of opening, etc....
The license fees hereinafter prescribed shall be as follows:(1) Upon one store the annual license fee shall be three dollars for each
such store;(2) Upon two stores or more, but not to exceed five stores, the annual
license fee shall be ten dollars for each such additional store;(3) Upon each store in excess of five, but not to exceed ten, the annual
license fee shall be fifteen dollars for each such additional store;(4) Upon each store in excess of ten, but not to exceed twenty, the annual
license fee shall be twenty dollars for each such additional store;(5) Upon each store in excess of twenty, the annual license see shall be
twenty-five dollars for each such additional store."
'N. C. ANN. CoDE (Michie, 1927), §2621 (63).
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causal relation between the breach of the statute and the death of the
passenger. 2
A majority of the courts, frequently on the basis of a statutory
definition of the crime, hold that a simple violatiou of a statute,
resulting in a homicide, will support a conviction of manslaughter.3
Others hold there must in addition be an element of reckless disregard
for human life.4 There is no statutory definition of manslaughter in
North Carolina. The supreme court of this state has taken the view
that a simple violation of a statute will support such a conviction if
the statute was designed to prevent injury to the person.5 It has been
intimated by the court that traffic regulations meet this condition. 6
The general purpose of the particular regulation here involved, which
authorizes the Highway Commission to designate through highways
by erecting stop signs at entrances thereto, and makes a failure to
stop at signs so erected unlawful, seems to bring it within the qual-
ification. Apparently, this is assumed in the decision.
In construing the statute, the court comes to the conclusion that
its purpose is simply to give a driver on a side road an opportunity to
inform himself of conditions on an intersecting highway. It logically
follows that if this particular driver already had such knowledge,
compliance with the statute would have been a useless procedure
without effect on the situation, and the violation was not the prox-
imate cause of the accident.
However, one might differ with the court's construction, which
practically nullifies this remedial statute as to "open" intersections.
The view might be taken that the duty imposed on the defendant was
not only to inform himself of conditions on the highway, but also to
act on such information; that the duty was not only to determine
whether he could enter the highway with reasonable safety to him-
self and others, but also not to enter unless it could be done with such
reasonable safety. It seems likely that the legislative intent was to
'State v. Satterfield, 198 N. C. 682, 153 S. E. 155 (1930).
"Kimmel v. State, 198 Ind. 444, 154 N. E. 16 (1926); State v. Schaeffer,
96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N. E. 220 (1917) ; McBride v. State, 20 Ala. App. 434,
102 So. 728 (1925).
'People v. Falkovitch, 280 Ill. 321, 117 N. E. 398 (1917) ; People v. Barnes,
182 Mich. 179, 148 N. W. 400 (1914).
'State v. Vines, 93 N. C. 493 (1885) (pointing gun in sport); State v.
Turnage, 138 N. C. 566, 49 S. E. 913 (1905) (pointing gun) ; State v. Stitt,
146 N. C. 643, 61 S. E. 566, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 308 (1918) (pointing pistol);
State v. Whaley, 191 N. C. 387, 132 S. E. 6 (1926) (violating speed law).
'State v. Whaley, supra note 5.
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give traffic on a through highway the right of way7 and prevent just
what happened in this case-a car turning from a side road into a
highway immediately in front of a car thereon. The court says,
".. . the object of the statute is not to delay or impede travel. . ....
This is no doubt true. In fact, it is probable that the legislature was
seeking to speed up travel. But it is also probable that it had in mind
travel on the main highway.
If it be admitted that the purpose of the statute was to give traffic
on main highways the right of way, the instant situation then be-
comes similar to that in the New York case of Shirley v. Larkin Co.,s
in which X entered an intersection immediately in front of Y, who
had the right of way. The court there said that in disregard of the
statute, X "recklessly went on when it was his duty to wait for the
other car" and "precipitated the accident."
It is a familiar rule of bailments that when a carrier has de-
viated from his proper course, and goods in his possession have been
damaged, ". . . he cannot set up as an answer to the action the bare
possibility of a loss if his wrongful act had never been done."0 It is
interesting to speculate as to what would be the result if a rule anal-
ogous to this were applied in situations like the present one, and a
defendant were required to show that compliance with the statute
would not have prevented the result complained of instead of the
prosecution being required to show that compliance would have pre-
vented such result. 10
HuGH L. LOnDELL.
Damages-Measure of Recovery on Dissolution of
Injunction Restraining Foreclosure Sale
A recent North Carolina case raises the interesting question as to
the measure of damages that should be allowed to a defendant who
has been restrained from selling land under a power contained in a
deed of trust.'
'See Roe v. Kurtz, 203 Iowa 906, 210 N. W. 550 (1926).8239 N. Y. 94, 145 N. E. 751 (1924). A fact situation very similar to the
instant case is involvdd in Lasene v. Syvanen, 123 Ore. 629, 263 Pac. 59 (1928).
But cf. Teissier v. Stewart, 11 La. App. 164, 123 So. 174 (1929).
'Davis v. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716 (1830).
"In Conrad v. Springfield Con. Ry. Co., 240 Ill. 12, 88 N. E. 180 (1909)
it is said that one charged with a tort resulting from violation of an ordinance
may show in defense that compliance would not have prevented the injury
complained of.
'Gruber v. Ewbanks, 199 N. C. 335, 154 S. E. 318 (1930).
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In North Carolina, an undertaking is required as a condition prec-
edent to obtaining a restraining order or an injunction "to the effect
that the plaintiff will pay to the party enjoined such damages . . . as
he sustains by reason of the injunction, if the court finally decides
that the'plaintiff was not entitled to it."'2 Subject to certain limita-
tions to be set forth, the injunction defendant may recover all dam-
ages which are the natural and proximate results of the wrongful
issuance of the injunction. In the situation where a mortgagee is
restrained from selling land under the mortgage, one of the chief
elements of damage is loss of security. Any such loss may be re-
covered provided that the amount realized, or to be realized at the
sale, is inadequate to satisfy the mortgagee's interest-i. e., the debt,
interest thereon to the time of sale, and costs.3 The language used
by most courts in prescribing the measure of damages for loss of
security is loose and ambiguous. 4 It seems that any diminution in
value occurring between the time the sale would have taken place but
for the injunction and the time it actually has or, in the exercise of
due diligence after the dissolution, should have taken place is a result
of the injunction. Accordingly, recovery should be allowed for the
difference between the amount actually realized, or to be realized, at
the later sale and what would have been realized at the one enjoined.5
The postponement of the sale has delayed the mortgagee in the receipt
of money which he was entitled to. He should thus recover interest
on the money he would have received at the enjoined sale until the
time of the actual sale6 and interest on the difference between the
'N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §854; Davis v. Champion Fiber Co.,
175 N. C. 25, 94 S. E. 671 (1918) (Held damages might be recovered where
there was a partial dissolution of the injunction.).
'Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md. v. Walker, 158 Ala. 129, 48 So. 600(1909) ; Schening v. Cofer, 97 Ala. 726, 12 So. 414 (1893) ; Foster v. Good-
rich, 127 Mass. 176 (1879); Edwards v. Bodine, 4 Edw. Ch. 292 (N. Y.
1843).
'Hill v. Thomas, 19 S. C. 230 (1882) (during delay of the sale) ; Belmont
Mining Co. v. Costigan, 21 Colo. 465, 42 Pac. 650 (1895) (from issuance to
dissolution) ; Gibson v. Reed, 54 Neb. 309, 75 N. W. 1085 (1895) (during the
time the injunction is in force) ; Meysenburg, Trustee for Sternberger v.
Schlieper, 48 Mo. 426 (1871) (during the time the sale is suspended).
This diminution in value may be caused by any of several things. Gib-
son v. Reed, supra note 4 (depreciation in value of the property) ; Osage Oil
Refining Co. v. Chandler, 287 Fed. 848 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1923) (decline in value
of stock) ; Aldrich v. Reynolds, 1 Barb. Ch. 613 (N. Y. 1846) (removal of
emblements) ; Moore v. Maryland Casualty Co., 280 Pac. 1008 (Cal. 1929);
De St. Aubin v. King, 209 Ill. App. 419 (1918); White v. Brooke, 11 Wash.
99, 39 Pac. 237 (1895) (sale of property under another mortgage).
'Hill v. Thomas, supra note 4; Johnson v. Moser, 72 Iowa 654, 34 N. W.
459 (1887); Holthaus v. Hart, 9 Mo. App. 1 (1880); Aldrich v. Reynolds,
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two amounts from the time of the actual sale until the time of judg-
ment on the injunction bond.7 When the mortgagee is entitled to
receive the rents and profits of the land as additional security and is
restrained from collecting these, the reasonable value thereof should
be allowed during the period of restraint.8
Other items of damage not dependent upon injury to the mort-
gagee's interest and unrestricted by the limitation that no more than
the debt, interest and costs may be recovered, are allowed. These
include the cost of the enjoined sale9 and the reasonable value of the
use of the land where the mortgagee can prove to a reasonably certain
degree that he would have purchased at the enjoined sale.' 0 North
Carolina refuses recovery for attorney's fees"' and expenses 12 in-
curred in obtaining a dissolution of the injunction. But these items
are permitted by a majority of the states.' 3
supra note 5; Pepper v. Dunlap, 19 La. 491 (1841) (no recovery for interest
on notes falling due after the injunction issues) ; Belmont Mining and Milling
Co., supra note 4 (error to allow interest on whole debt in the absence of a
showing that the property would have brought as much).
Aldrich v. Reynolds, supra note 5.
S Schening c. Cofer, supra note 3 (recoverable if debt is not satisfied by
the sale) ; Metz v. Brodfuehrer, 214 Ill. App. 458 (1919) (reasonable rental
value and not amount of rents actually received) ; Curry v. American Free-
hold Land Mortgage Co., 124 Ala. 614, 27 So. 454 (1900) (no recovery be-
cause a receiver could and should have been appointed to collect the rents).
'De St. Aubin v. King, supra note 5; Edwards v. Bodine, supra note 3;
Alliance Trust Co. v. Stewart, 115 Mo. 236, 21 S. W. 793 (1893).
10 Belmont Mining and Milling Co. v. Costigan, supra note 4 (court willing
to assume claimant would have bought in the absence of proof that others
would have, but not allowed because no evidence of the value of possession) ;
Holthaus v. Hart, supra note 6 (as purchaser at the foreclosure sale he might
have demanded the rent at once) ; Johnson v. Moser, supra note 6 (no recovery
because the sale did not take place and it is impossible to know who would
have bought); Bullard v. Harkness, 83 Iowa 373, 49 N. W. 855 (1891) (too
speculative).
'Midget v. Vann, 158 N. C. 128, 73 S. E. 801 (1912). The federal courts
and a respectable minority of the states also refuse recovery for this item.
Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. 211, 21 L. ed. 43 (1872) ; Note (1927) 55 A. L. R.
452. The leading North Carolina case, Hyman v. Devereaux, 65 N. C. 588(1871), permits recovery for counsel fees fixed by statute at that time, but
refuses to allow them if fixed by the parties.
'Midget v. Vann, supra note 11 (refusing recovery for expenses in at-
tending the hearing on the injunction); Gruber v. Ewbanks, supra note 1(refusing the expense of obtaining the presence of a non-resident witness).
Permitting recovery for counsel fees: Jesse French Piano and Organ Co.
v. Porter, 134 Ala. 302, 32 So. 678, 92 Am. ST. REP. 31 (1902); Burglass v.
Villere, 129 So. 209 (La. 1930) ; Oklahoma Cotton Growers Ass'n v. Hooven,
272 Pac. 852 (Okla. 1928); Aldrich v. Reynolds, supra note 5. Permitting
recovery for reasonable expenses: Waldauer v. Parks, 141 Miss. 617, 106 So.
881 (1926) (expenses in preparing for and attending trial); Alliance Trust
Co. v. Stewart, supra note 9 (cost of taking a deposition out of the state) ;
Bartram v. Ohio and B. S. Ry. Co., 141 Ky. 100, 132 S. W. 188 (1910) (re-
fusing value of time spent in attending trial but allowing traveling expenses).
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In all cases where malice or want of probable cause is absent, no
liability exists apart from the injunction bond and recovery is limited
to the penal sum thereof. 14 In North Carolina, the judgment dis-
solving the injunction carries with it a judgment for damages against
the parties procuring it and the sureties on the undertaking, to be
ascertained by reference or otherwise as the judge directs. 15 But
there can be no assessment of damages until the final determination
of the cause in which the injunction is obtained. 16 A motion for
damages must be made at or before the time the final judgment is
entered and no separate action can be maintained upon the bond. 17
This procedure raises difficult problems where a foreclosure sale is
restrained and the injunction continues until the final adjudication.
In such cases it will be necessary to assess damages before there can
be a sale. It must be shown that the debt, interest, and costs will not
-be realized on a sale and that the value of the security has been im-
paired. An actual sale is the easiest and most reliable way to estab-
lish this. The difficulty is obviated by permitting a separate action
on the bond after the sale has taken place.' 8
T. C. SMITH, JR.
Equity-Injunction to Prevent Garnishment of Wages-
Effect of Usury
In a recent Georgia case,' a wage earner sought an injunction
against the enforcement of a "sale of wages" given as a security for
a loan alleged to have been usurious, on the ground that the plaintiff
would lose his job if garnishment proceedings were brought. The
" 10th Ward Rd. District v. Texas and Pac. Ry. Co., 12 F. (2d) 245; 45
A. L. R. 1513 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926) ; Mark v. Hyatt, 135 N. Y. 306, 31 N. E.
1099; 18 L. R. A. 275 (1892); McAden v. Williams, 191 N. C. 105, 131 S. E.
375 (1926); Nausemond Timber Co. v. Rountree, 122 N. C. 51, 29 S. E. 61(1898).
" N. C. AN1. CODE (Michie, 1927) §855.
"'Raleigh and Western Ry. Co. v. Glendon and Gulf Mining and Manu-
facturing Co., 117 N. C. 191, 23 S. E. 181 (1895); Thompson v. McNair, 64
N. C. 448 (1870) (an injunction is an ancillary remedy and until the final
determination of the cause, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the order
was not rightfully obtained).
Crawford v. Pearson, 116 N. C. 718, 21 S. E. 561 (1895) ; Shute v. Shute,
180 N. C. 386, 104 S. E. 764 (1920). See McCall v. Webb, 135 N. C. 356, 365,
42 S. E. 802, 805 (1904).
"' Okla. Cotton Growers Ass'n v. Hooven, supra note 13; Belmont Mining
Co. v. Costigan, supra note 4; Gibson v. Reed, supra note 4. In the absence of
a statute permitting damages to be recovered in the same action, they cannot
be allowed. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Dey, 76 Iowa 278, 41 N. W. 17
(1888) ; American Bonding Co. v. State, 120 Md. 305, 87 Ati. 922 (1913).
'Lawrence v. Patterson, 153 S. E. 29 (Ga. 1930).
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defendants filed demurrers, pleas and counter-claims for the full
amount of the wages assigned. Upon an auditor's finding in favor of
defendants, held, injunction denied unless plaintiff first pay principal
and lawful interest, as "he who comes into equity must do equity";
and lenders' counter-claim allowed. The Chief Justice dissented.
Nearly all of the decisions agree with the principal case that when
a debtor seeks to enjoin the enforcement of a usurious loan, he "must
do equity" by paying into court the amount lawfully due, including
principal and the legal rate of interest.2 And the same view is taken
whether the security given is an assignment of wages3 or a mortgage.
On its face, this might seem fair enough. There were in the principal
case, however, a number of factors which cast doubt on the fairness
of this requirement in wage assignment cases generally.
It should first be noted, however, that the announced condition to
an injunction that the plaintiff pay the legal rate of interest as well as
the principal, when the Georgia statutes4 provide for the forfeiture
of all interest on usurious loans, is misleading. This was uttered in
connection with a finding that the loan was not usurious. And the
judgment on the counter-claim, actually affirmed, did not speak in
terms of principal and interest but was for the total wages for a given
period on the theory that the title thereto had passed to the defendants
and that the plaintiff by taking the wages had converted them. This
assumes, as does the defendants' own description of themselves as
"buyers of salaries" that the loans were never expected to be paid.
The statute permitted but 33 % per annum on loans of less than
$300.00. It was alleged that the usury came into the case by the
method of charging for renewals of loans in short periods of less
than thirty days, and that "petitioner signed papers for the defendants
without reading the same, knowing that they were made out as only
a part of a scheme and a device to defeat the usury laws, by signing
2 Mortgage Securities Corp. v. Levy, 11 F. (2d) 270 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926) ;
Polite v. Williams, 149 Ga. 726, 10 S. E. 791 (1920); Poulk v. Cario Banking
Co., 158 Ga. 338, 12 S. E. 292 (1924) ; Carver v. Brady, 104 N. C. 220, 10 S. E.
565 (1889); Owens v. Wright, 161 N. C. 127, 76 S. E. 735, ANN. CAs. 1914D,
1021 (1912) ; LAWRaNcE, EQ. Jus. (1929) §1089; PommoY, EQ. Jus. (4th ed.)
§§391, 937.
There is some authority for the proposition that a penalty for usury pro-
vided by statute may be deducted from the principal and legal rate of interest.
Lewis v. Hickman, 200 Ala. 672, 77 So. 46 (1917); Union Bank v. Bell, 14
Ohio St. 200 (1862) ; Yonack v. Emery, 13 S. W. (2d) 677 (Tex. 1929).
'Patterson v. Moore, 146 Ga. 364, 91 S. E. 116 (1917); Roberts v. Penn.
Loan and Trust Co., 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 358 (1909) ; cf. Cox v. Hughes, 10 Cal.
App. 553, 102 Pac. 956 (1909).
"GA. ANN. CoDa (Michie, 1926) §§3438, 3439.
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the same because he needed the money." There were eight of these
"buyers of salaries" from whom the plaintiff had borrowed a number
of sums ranging from $5.00 to $15.00 each over a year's time.
Although the defendants in their counter-claim had raised a legal
issue on which plaintiff was by the Constitution entitled to a jury,5
the case was referred to an auditor. The plaintiff excepted on the
ground, among others, that the auditor was prejudiced against en-
forcement of the small loans of the state, and was disqualified because
other loan companies were clients of his law office. Finally, it was
alleged that the service of the wage assignment on the employer
would cause plaintiff to lose his position. The court objected that the
allegation was too general, in that it did not set out facts to show
petitioner would lose his position or be irreparably injured. But in
an earlier Georgia case, 6 plaintiff had failed although he set out a
contract of employment in which the plaintiff was to be discharged,
if garnishment or wage assignment papers were ever served.
This characteristic failure7 to investigate the actualities of eco-
nomic duress and of the effects of garnishment proceedings in con-
nection with the small loan business is, doubtless, the reason for
remedial legislation in Massachusetts8 and Minnesota9 and for the
drastic action of the California'0 and Kansas" 1 courts, which last
year, upon injunction proceedings brought by the Attorney General,
stopped the operation of a "loan-shark" business as a public nuisance.
H. B. PARKER.
Equity-Injunction to Restrain Enforcement of
Municipal Ordinance
An ordinance imposed an occupation tax upon persons engaged in
the business of delivering gasoline and oils from wagons or trucks.
Plaintiff failed to pay this tax and defendant caused a levy to be made
'GA. CONSr., §18, par. 1; CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 64.
' Patterson v. Moore, supra note 3.
"Lisle, A Widespread Form of Usury: The "Loan-Shark" (1912) 3 J.
CRIm. L. 167; Hodson, Ideal Anti-Loan Shark Statute (1919) 10 J. CRIm. L.
129.
'Acrs MAss. (1911) c. 727, §13; Thomas v. Bunce, 223 Mass. 311, 111
N. E. 871 (1916).
'MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §7040; Trauernicht v. Kingston, 136 Minn.
445, 195 N. W. 278 (1923).
" People ex rel Stephens v. Seccombe, 284 Pac. 725 (Cal. App. 1930);
(1930) 18 CALIF. L. REv. 328.
' State v. McMahon, 280 Pac. 906 (Kan. 1929); (1929) 15 CORN. L. Q.
472; (1929) 43 HARv. L. REv. 499; (1929) 28 MIcH. L. REv. 939.
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upon certain of plaintiff's property. Prosecutions were also begun
against plaintiff's agents, and defendant threatened to continue to
prosecute. Held, the refusal of the lower court to enjoin the prosecu-
tions and executions was error, equitable intervention being necessary
to protect property rights and to prevent a multiplicity of actions.1
The courts have repeatedly laid down the general rule that equity
will not restrain the enforcement of a municipal ordinance, saying
that an adequate remedy is available at law by setting up the invalid-
ity or inapplicability of the ordinance as a defense to a criminal
prosecution. And most courts accordingly deny relief in the bulk of
the cases.2
Well-recognized exceptions to the rule, however, are where in-
junctive relief is necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property,
or the necessity of defending a multiplicity of prosecutions. 8 Thus,
injunctive relief has been granted to restrain the enforcement of an
ordinance making it unlawful to operate a baseball park in a certain
district ;4 prescribing paved floors and sewerage connections for all
stables wherein more than one animal is kept ;5 providing an occupa-
tion tax of $300.00 for ice dealers, and $100.00 additional for each
wagon used;6 prescribing certain safety appliances for street cars,
under penalty of $100.00 or thirty days in jail, where the city was also
threatening to stop cars and to arrest employees operating cars with-
out the prescribed appliances ;7 prohibiting the erection or maintain-
'Wofford Oil Co. v. City of Boston, 154 S. E. 145 (Ga. 1930).
'City of Savannah v. Granger, 145 Ga. 578, 89 S. E. 690 (1916) ; Jones v.
Carlton, 146 Ga. 1, 90 S. E. 278 (1916) ; Steinberg v. City of Savannah, 149
Ga. 69, 99 S. E. 36 (1919) ; Burton v. City of Toccoa, 158 Ga. 63, 122 S. E.
603 (1924) ; Deloney v. Village of Columbia, 142 La. 291, 76 So. 717 (1917);
City of Dallas v. Cluck and Murphey, 234 S. W. 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921);
Los Angeles Title Insurance Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. App. 152, 198
Pac. 1001 (1921) ; Giglio v. Barrett, 207 Ala. 728, 92 So. 668 (1922) ; Edwards
v. DeVance, 138 Miss. 580, 103 So. 194 (1925).
'4 POMEROY, EQuIrY (4th ed., 1919) §1777; 2 LAWENCE, EQUITY (1929)
§972; 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed., 1911) §§650, 1573; Mc-
QUILLAN, MUNIcIPAL. CORPOvATIONS (2nd ed., 1928) §851, citing many cases
and illustrations; Notes (1893) 21 L. R. A. 84; (1906) 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 631;
(1910) 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 193; (1911) 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 454; (1912) 35
L. R. A. (N. S.) 193; L. R. A. 1916C 263.
'New Orleans Baseball & Amusement Co. v. City of New Orleans, 118 La.
228, 42 So. 784, 7 L. R. A. (S. C.) 1114 (1907).
Board of Comm'rs. of Mobile v. Orr, 181 Ala. 308, 61 So. 920, 45 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 575 (1913).
Williams v. Mayor and Council of Waynesboro, 152 Ga. 696, 111 S. E. 47(1922). See also Southern Express Co. v. Town of Ty Ty, 141 Ga. 421, 81
S. E. 114 (1914).
'Mahoning & S. Ry. & Light Co. v. City of New Castle, 233 Pa. 413, 82
At. 501 (1912).
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ance of more than one crematory to a township ;8 of. a licensing ordi-
nance for peddlers ;9 of an ordinance prohibiting the driving of any
"engine or heavy machinery" over paved streets, in a suit by the
owner of a machine shop who could not otherwise reach the railway
station ;1o prohibiting commercial advertising on the outside of street
cars;" prohibiting the maintainance of any hospital within the city
for the treatment of contagious or infectious diseases ;12 providing a
penalty for each day plaintiff gas company failed to maintain a
minimum pressure, in the face of a failing supply ;13 providing for
the erection of safety gates by railroad companies ;14 regulating the
speed of trains through the town ;15 of an ordinance of a city the
limits of which embraced considerable rural territory, prohibiting the
keeping of hogs within the city. 16 In many of these ordinances, each
day of violation constituted a separate offense.
The North Carolina court has been extremely conservative in
allowing injunctive relief against the enforcement of ordinances. In
the early case of Cohen v. Goldsboro,17 the plaintiff was arrested,
fined, and forced to suspend business for violation of an ordinance
regulating the sale of fresh meat. Injunction was denied, the court
saying that if the ordinance was invalid plaintiff had an adequate
remedy at law in an action for damages as often as he was arrested.' 8
In Wardens v. Washington'9 the court refused to pass on the validity
of an ordinance prohibiting the burial of the dead within the town
except on permit, and ruled likewise in Scott v. Smith,20 in which
plaintiff sought to restrain the enforcement of an ordinance prohibit-
ing the playing of baseball in town without the mayor's permission.
'Abbey Land Improvement Co. v. San Mateo County, 167 Cal. 434, 139 Pac.
1068 (1914).
'Ideal Tea Co. v. City of Salem, 77 Ore. 182, 150 Pac. 852 (1915).
10 Brown v. Nichols, 93 Kan. 737, 145 Pac. 561 (1915).
Pacific Rys. Advertising Co. v. City of Oakland, 98 Cal. App. 165, 276
Pac. 629 (1929).
San Diego Tuberculosis Ass'n v. City of East San Diego, 186 Cal. 252, 200
Pac. 393 (1921).
"Kansas City Gas Co. v. Kansas City, 198 Fed. 500 (W. D. Mo. 1912).
"
4Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Harmon, 163 Ky. 669, 156 S. W. 121 (1913).
"Lusk v. Town of Dora, 224 Fed. 650 (N. D. Ala. 1915).
"
0Dibrell v. Town of Coleman, 172 S. W. 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914). But
cf. Brown v. City of Thomasville, 156 Ga. 260, 118 S. E. 854 (1923) ; Up-
church v. City of LaGrange, 159 Ga. 113, 125 S. E. 47 (1924).
1177 N. C. 2 (1877).
'Since a town is not liable to respond in damages for attempting to exer-
cise a misconceived governmental power, and since arresting officers are usually
insolvent, the inadequacy of this remedy is readily apparent.
109 N. C. 21, 13 S. E. 700 (1891).
o121 N. C. 94, 28 S. E. 64 "(1898).
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Actions seeking to test the validity of ordinances regulating saloons
and providing for forfeiture of license on conviction, 2' and provid-
ing for the removal of all telegraph or light poles to within twenty-
four inches of the curb, 22 were similarly dismissed. However, the
past five years have witnessed a tendency on the part of the court to
relax the rigidity of these earlier decisions, 23 reliance being placed
upon a line of Federal decisions beginning with Truax v. Raich.2 4
In a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance prohibiting the
sale of meats within a defined area except at the municipal market,
Clarkson, J., went into the merits of the case and held the ordinance
valid, but intimated that injunction would otherwise lie.2 And in
Advertising Co. v. Asheville26 an injunction was granted to restrain
the enforcement of an alleged confiscatory taxing ordinance.
It is submitted that courts should liberalize the use of the injunc-
tion to test the validity and construction of town ordinances. 27 The
2 Paul v. Washington, 134 N. C. 363, 47 S. E. 763 (1904).
" R. R. v. Morehead City, 167 N. C. 118, 83 S. E. 259 (1914). In this case,
however, Hoke, J., goes into the merits, although denying that injunction
would lie to restrain prosecutions, and holds the ordinance valid.
'Clark, C. J., in Express Co. v. High Point, 167 N. C. 103, 83 S. E. 254
(1914) : "I concur that an injunction does not lie to restrain the State against
executing its criminal law. The defendant has a full remedy by raising any
objection to the validity of the law upon the trial of the indictment for the
criminal offense. Equity never interferes, especially by injunction, when there
is a full remedy at law." To this same unqualified language of Clark, C. J.,
in Turner v. New Bern, 187 N. C. 541, 122 S. E. 469 (1924) Hoke, Stacy and
Adams, JJ., registered their dissent, saying that equity would intervene if re-
quired for the adequate protection of property rights, but concurred in the
result, holding the ordinance valid.
'239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 60 L. ed. 131, L. R. A. 1916D 545 (1915).
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 571, 69 L. ed. 1070
(1925); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 44 Sup. Ct. 15, 68 L. ed. 255
(1923).
2 See Angelo v. Winston-Salem, 193 N. C. 207, 212, 136 S. E. 489, 492, 52
A. L. R. 663, 666 (1926).
189 N. C. 738, 128 S. E. 149 (1925). But cf. Crawford v. Town of
Marion, 154 N. C. 73, 69 S. E. 763, 35 L. 1R A. (N. S.) 193 (1910) in which
the court granted the injunction, but denied the question of restraining the en-
forcement of the criminal law was involved.
' See (1923) 9 A. B. A. J. 168, in which Mr. Simon Fleischman directs an
argument in favor of the use of the injunction after the violation but before
the trial. This seems to stop far short of the full usefulness of the remedy.
The situation in Elizabeth City v. Aydlett, 198 N. C. 585, 152 S. E. 681
(1930) is just the opposite of that in the instant case. The city had prosecuted
defendant criminally for violation of an orainance. A local court held the
ordinance invalid and discharged defendant, leaving the city with no right of
appeal. The city then sought to enjoin a further violation of the ordinance,
but the relief asked for was denied, the court apparently relying largely on
decisions to the effect that equity would not enjoin the enforcement of
ordinances.
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same policy behind the move to empower courts to render declaratory
judgments furnishes a sound argument. The use of this method
would spare the plaintiff whom the ordinance effects the necessity of
choosing between a curtailment of operations to conform to the
ordinance or the stigma of defending a criminal prosecution and risk-
ing an adverse result, with consequent fine or sentence.28 One who
tries in good faith to obey valid laws and ordinances should not be
forced by the courts to become a lawbreaker in order to protect his
constitutional rights, on the now exploded assumption that such a
procedure constitutes an "adequate remedy" at law.
PEYTON B. ABBOTT, JR.
Evidence-Impeaching Witness by Showing Religious Belief
Can a witness be impeached by inquiring into his religious faith?
This is one of the principal questions raised in State v. Beal,' the
dramatic murder trial growing out of the recent Gastonia strike dis-
turbances. The opinion expressly avoids a definite answer, 'but gen-
eral phases of the problem may profitably 'be considered.
Competency and Credibility
The common law idea of purging the witness box of prejudiced
and inferior witnesses has been superseded by a more enlightened
technique. Those qualities which formerly prevented the witness
from testifying at all-interest, infamy, and coverture-are now con-
sidered on the question of how much credit, conceding him to be
competent, is to be given to the witness 'by the triers of fact.2 This
change has been facilitated by the broad scope of the theory of tes-
timonial impeachment. All matters which give rise to an inference
or chain of inferences leading to the conclusion that the witness is
presently lying are relevant.3 The grounds of attack most commonly
accepted as thus relevant are those which formerly formed the basis
"In the recent case of Standard Oil Co. v. City of Charlottesville, 42 F.
(2d) 88 (C. C. A. 4th., 1930), plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement of
an ordinance intended to be a substitute for a zoning ordinance, which the
city was without power to pass under the circumstances. The District Court
held the ordinance valid, denied the injunction. Reversed, with instructions
that the injunction would lie, because the penalty provided for violation was
so great that it would be dangerous to test the validity in a criminal prosecu-
tion. Parker, Circuit Judge, quotes from Terrace v. Thompson, supra note 24,
to the effect that "the legal remedy must be as complete, practical and efficient
as that which equity could afford."1199 N. C. 276, 154 S. E. 604 (1930).
22 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) § 876.
3 Ibid., §877.
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for excluding the witness: 1. Defects of organic capacity. 2. Char-
acter. 3. Bias, interest, and corruption. 4 But difference of opinion
exists as to what phases of these generalized qualities-particularly
of character-are relevant; and the whole problem is complicated by
a mass of detailed rules, predicated on varying reasons of policy, as
to how these qualities shall 'be evidenced.
The religious belief of the witness fits anomalously into this
scheme of changing emphasis from the exclusionary to the impeach-
ing process. It has not -been so generally removed as a testimonial
disqualification 5 as have interest, infamy, and coverture, and the
question of its relevancy for impeachment purposes is not so readily
solved.
In Jurisdictions with Religious Test for Competency
North Carolina is one of the minority jurisdictions retaining the
common law rule which required the witness to believe in a God who
will punish false swearing in this world or the next as a requisite of
competency. 6 In such jurisdictions logically it should be allowable
'Ibid., c. XXX.
'Wigmore (§§518 and 1816) propounds the theory that religious belief has
never been considered strictly a testimonial qualification. Such belief is sig-
nificant only as a qualification to take the oath, and the oath exists to subject a
person possessed of the faculties (testimonial qualifications) considered inher-
ently necessary for a capacity to tell the truth to the stimulus to tell it. At
common law the oath requirement-"a prophylactic rule"-vas important
enough to exclude all testimony which was not generated from its impulse.
This elusive distinction might have a practical application in construing at
least one of a fairly commorn type of statute. N. M. ANN. STAT. §2165 pro-
vides: "Hereafter in the courts of this state no person shall be disqualified to
give evidence on account of any disqualification known to the common law, but
all such common law disqualifications may be shown for the purpose of affect-
ing the credibility of any such witness and for no other purpose. . . ." A
legitimate construction would be that want of religious belief was not a testi-
monial disqualification and is thus not covered by the statute. However, the
express wording of the following unfortunate statutes would have to be dis-
regarded to prevent impeachment by religious belief: NEV. REV. LAWS §5419(". . . Facts which by the common law would cause the exclusion of witnesses
may still 'be shown for the purpose of affecting their credibility.....") ; Nn.
Comp. STAT. (1922) §8845; IowA CODE (1927) §3637, State v. Elliott, 45 Iowa
486 (1877) ; Searcy v. Miller, 57 Iowa 613, 10 N. W. 912 (1881).
'Shaw v. Moore, 49 N. C. 25 (1856); Omichund v. Barker, 1 Ark. 45
(1744) ; Note (1899) 42 L. R. A. 553; Biggs, Religiowt Belief as Qualification of
a Witness (1929) 8 N. C. L. Ray. 31. In State v. Pitt, 166 N. C. 268, 80 S. E.
1060 (1914) it was held that the ruling of competency of the trial judge was
conclusive, although the proffered witness had stated that he did not know
what would happen to him for lying other than imprisonment. Adams, J., in
Lanier v. Bryan, 184 N. C. 235, 114 S. E. 6 (1922) interprets this decision as
retaining the common law requirements in their pristine vigor. The finding
of the trial court is conclusive, he argues, because it implies a finding of the
"requisite facts," and he quotes the language of Pearson, J., in Shaw v.
Moore, to the effect that one of the requisite facts is fear of punishment by
the laws of God.
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to impeach a witness by showing a lack of the exact theological belief
required for competency, and his statements should be open to con-
tradiction on the ground that the matter is not collateral.7 Practically
this exact information could not be elicited from the witness or
proved extrinsically without opening up a broader inquiry, partic-
ularly when the course pursued consisted in contradiction. The cases
abound with examples of crudely inquisitorial examinations of the
witness' religious beliefs.8 The abuses to which this course of ques-
tioning is subject by its inevitable appeal to the jury's prejudices
furnish a cogent reason to exclude all evidence of religious belief for
impeachment purposes. A better solution would be to remove the
logical necessity by abolishing religious belief as one of the requisites
of competency. New Hampshire, the only state retaining religious
belief as a testimonial qualification which was found to rule on the
form of impeachment in issue, properly disallows it. But the reason
assigned-repugnance to the spirit of American institutions-is
naive.9
In Jurisdictions without Religious Test for Competency
The vast majority of states have abolished the testimonial dis-
qualification of want of belief in a God who punishes for perjury.
The weight of authority in these jurisdictions is against allowing
inquiry into the religious belief of a witness as a form of impeach-
ment. Statutes in Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska,
Nevada, and Tennessee allow it.1°  It is disallowed by statute in
Arizona, Connecticut, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont,
and Washington." In California, Kansas, and Kentucky constitu-
tional and statutory provisions removing religious belief as a requisite
'2 WIGmopE EVIDENCE (1923) §§1003 and 1020 as to what matter is col-
lateral.
'E.g., Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Mayes, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 187, 80 S.- W.
1096 (1904).
' N. H. Pun. LAWS (1926) c. 336, §23; Free v. Buckingham, 59 N. H. 219(1879).
" GA. ANN. CoDE (Michie, 1926) §5857, Donkle v. Kohn, 44 Ga. 266 (1871);
IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) §§560-1, Snyder v. Nations, 5 Blackf. 295
(Ind. 1840); Iowa, supra note 5; MAss. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 233, §19; Huns-
corn v. Hunscom, 15 Mass. 184 (1818) ; Com. v. Buzzell, 16 Pick. 153 (1834) ;
Com. v. Burke, 16 Gray 33 (1860) ; Allen v. Guarante, 253 Mass. 152, 148 N.
E. 461 (1925); Nebraska, supra note 5; Nevada supra note 5; TENN. ANN.
CoDE (Shannon, 1917) §5593. See Odell v. Kopper, 52 Tenn. 73, 77 (1871).
"Ariz. Const. II, §12; CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1918) §5705 (disallowed by clear
implication); MicH. ComP. LAWS (Cahill, 1915) §4336, People v. Jenness, 5
Mich. 305 (1858); Omz. LAws (Olson, 1920) §731; PA. STAT. (West, 1920)
§21834; VT. GEN. LAws (1917) §1895; Wash. Const. I, §11.
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of competency-along with constitutional guaranties of enjoyment of
civil capacities irrespective of religious faith and freedom of religious
worship-have been held to disclose a legislative intent to exclude
such evidence for impeachment purposes. 12 England rules against it
on the ground of its prejudicial effect. 3 The Maine court considers
unfair surprise of the impeached witness as a reason inter alia for its
exclusion.' 4 Louisiana intimates categorically that it should be ex-
cluded, 15 while Illinois excludes it on the threefold ground of repug-
nance to constitutional guaranties, irrelevance, and prejudice. 10 The
question must be regarded as unsettled in New York,17 Ohio, and
South Carolina,' 8 and the other states appear not to have ruled on it.
'People v. Copsey, 71 Cal. 548, 12 Pac. 721 (1887) ; Dickinson v. Beal,
10 Kan. App. 233, 62 Pac. 724 (1900) ; L. & N. Ry. Co. v. Mayes, supra note
8; Bush v. Com., 80 Ky. 244 (1882).
The provisions of the North Carolina Constitution guaranteeing freedom
of religious worship (I, §26) and disqualifying for office those who deny the
existence of Almighty God (VI, §8) would seem to bear no logical connection
with the problem in hand. However, Pearson, J., in Shaw v. Moore, supra
note 6, at 31, said arguendo that had the strict common law excluding Jews
and Christians who did not believe in future rewards not been changed to admit
them by Omichund v. Barker, supra note 6, it would have been so changed by
I, §26 (then §19 of declaration of rights). If this tenuous premise be ac-
cepted, it follows that a fortiori this provision would operate to admit atheists.
Its supposed curative power might also be easily extended the next step to
prevent the form of impeachment in issue, particularly in view of the looseness
of the original idea that to exclude Jews and Christians of irregular con-
viction as to the hereafter would be unconstitutional because it would be "to
degrade and persecute them for 'opinion's sake.'" This argument must be re-jected at its first step. It is untenable to hold that to exclude a witness on
religious grounds is to deprive him of worshipping as he pleases.
"Darby v. Ouseley, 1 H. & N. 1, 156 E. R. 1093 (1856). But cf. Brad-
laugh v. Edwards, 11 C. B. N. S. 377, 142 E. R. 843 (1861).
"Holley v. Webster, 21 Me. 461 (1842) (Held improper to show that wit-
ness had said that he intended now to serve the devil as long as he had served
the Lord; that he had a pack of cards with him which he carried about in
his pocket and called them his bible.) The Me. statute is ambiguous. "No per-
son is an incompetent witness on account of his religious belief, but he is sub-ject'to the test of credibility." M. REv. STAT. (1916) c. 87, §111.
1" See State v. Dyer, 154 La. 379, 97 So. 563, 564 (1923).
" Starks v. Schlensky, 128 Ill. App. 1 (1906).
1 People v. McGarren, 17 Wend. 460 (1837) (allowed); see Stanbro v.
Hopkins, 28 Barb. 265 (N. Y. 1858) (dictum that it is allowable). But see
Gibson v. Am. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 37 N. Y. 580, 584 (1868) (dictum that it
is not allowable) ; Brink v. Stratton, 176 N. Y. 150, 68 N. E. 148, 150 (1903)(inconsistent dicta in seriatim opinions). In People v. Most, 128 N. Y. 108,
27 N. E. 970 (1891) the objection was held frivolous.
"Clinton v. State, 33 Ohio St. 27 (1877) (Defendant questioned on cross-
examination as to his belief in God and future state of rewards and punish-
ments. Held, prior inconsistent statements could not be shown) ; State v.
Turner, 36 S. C. 534, 15 S. E. 602 (1892) (similar holding). Under the true
rutle as to the matters on which prior contradictory statements 'may be shown,
these decisions are capable of two interpretations: 1. Religious belief is a
proper inquiry for impeachment, but may be shown only by the witness. 2. The
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Wigmore dismisses the problem summarily.1 9 On the whole the
decisions reveal no tendency to resolve the issue rationally into a
question of relevancy.
It is generally held allowable to impeach the credibility of the
declarant of a dying declaration by showing a lack of religious faith,
and the reason underlying the exceptional admission of this hearsay
testimony would seem to justify such a course.2 0 Also it seems gen-
erally allowable to use evidence of religious belief substantively,2 1
although the possibility of prejudice inherent in such evidence would
seem equal to that in evidence of defendant's insurance in a personal
injury action. The familiar ban on the latter might be extended to
cover both.
No argument has been made that testimony of religious belief is
proper for impeachment as character evidence. Language in the in-
stant case gives opening for such an argument, 22 and it might find
support in jurisdictions like North Carolina where the witness is
impeached by evidence of his general character rather than his verac-
ity-character. 23 However, belief is not so clearly an element of
character that the admission of this prejudicial evidence is required.
It is fair to conclude that those jurisdictions which allow inquiry
into the witness' religious faith to discredit him have lost sight of the
fact that the impeaching process is limited by the principle of rel-
evancy. Unorthodox religious convictions, even though they extend
to the extremes of agnosticism and atheism, may quite often exist
because of honest intellectual doubts. It is untenable to argue that
there is a correlation between this kind of unorthodoxy and inverac-
ity. That correlation which may exist between what Pope calls "blind
unbelief" and untruthfulness is so slight that the value of the
evidence is outweighed by the possibilities for prejudice with which it
is pregnant. Furthermore, it might be safely assumed that such effect
contradiction is error, because the evidence was inadmissible in the first in-
stance. See note 7.
" 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923) §936.
='Note (1922) 16 A. L. R. 411; (1929) 8 TENN. L. REv. 56.
' State v. Dyer, supra note 15 (Held proper to show to what religion witness
belonged to show improbability of his having been at a certain church). But
cf. Brundige v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. Rep. 596, 95 S. W. 527 (1906).
' State v. Beal, supra note 1, at 301. "It has been said that a man is what
he thinks, 'For as he thinketh in his heart, so is he.' Prov. 23 :7." Compare
language of Hunt, C. J., in Gibson v. Am. Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra note
17, at 584. "Conduct and life, as distinguished from belief, give the standard
of character."
" Note (1927) 5 N. C. L. REv. 340.
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as it does have will appear in the witness' reputation for veracity or
his general reputation in the community-a familiar inquiry.
Conclusion
The witness box should not be made more forbidding to persons
of potential value as witnesses by the fear of a scrutiny of their per-
sonal thoughts. The 1931 Legislature should adopt the remedy ac-
cepted by the majority of American states by removing religious
belief as a test of competency and prohibiting evidence of it to im-
peach. The Pennsylvania statute is a desirable model: "No witness
shall be questioned in any judicial proceeding concerning his religious
belief; nor shall any evidence be heard upon the subject for the
purpose of affecting either his competency or credibility." 24
JAmES H. CHADBOURN.
Federal Procedure-Transfer of Cases Between Law
and Equity Sides of Court
The case of Clarksbury Trust Co. v. Conmwrcial Casualty Co.'
was an action at law in a Federal District Court for West Virginia to
recover on a bond issued -by the defendant to cover a deposit of the
plaintiff in a Pennsylvania bank. The deposit in question was upon
a time certificate and was the only one contemplated in the security
transaction; the bond, however, clearly applied only to deposits sub-
ject to check. The plaintiff's declaration alleged that this was due to
a mutual mistake of law as to the meaning of the coverage clause in
the bond. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. Held,
on appeal, reversed and remanded with directions to transfer the case
to the equity side for reformation, with leave to amend the pleadings
and to introduce further evidence.
The questions of transfer between the law and equity sides of the
Federal Courts arise under the Judicial Code, section 274a,2 which
provides: "That in case any of said courts (courts of the United
States) shall find that a suit at law should have been brought in equity
or a suit in equity should have been brought at law, the court shall
order any amendments to the pleadings which may be necessary to
conform them to the proper practice. Any party to the suit shall have
the right, at any stage of the cause, to amend his pleadings so as to
PA. STAT. (West, 1920) §21834.140 F. (2d) 626 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
'38 STAT. 956 (1915), 28 U. S. C. A., §397 (1928).
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obviate the objection that his suit was not brought on the right side
of the court. The cause shall proceed and be determined upon such
amended pleadings. All testimony taken before such amendment, if
preserved, shall stand as testimony in the cause with like effect as if
the pleadings had been originally in the amended form." This pro-
vision, together with equity rules 22 and 23,3 and section 274b Judi-
cial Code4 which provides that equitable defenses may be interposed
in actions at law by answer, plea or replication, greatly facilitates the
fusion of law and equity in the Federal Courts. 5
The Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit has directly con-
sidered section 274a in eight cases. The court first construed the
statute in 1916 shortly after its passage.0 Judge Pritchard, though
not deciding the case solely upon these grounds stated that the statute
(section 274a) "relates only to the power of the court in a case where
a suit has been improperly brought either on the equity or law side,
and authorizes amendments to have the pleading conform to the
proper practice." Thus Judge Pritchard narrowly interpreted the
statute as applying to actions brought on the proper side of the court
but with the wrong type of pleadings. The next case in this circuit7
did not consider section 274a, but decided under equity rule 22 that
the case should not be transferred to law as a cause of action in equity
had been set out. Beginning with the case of Fidelity and Casualty
Co. v. Glenn8 the court indicates a more liberal attitude. In speaking
'Rule 22: "If at any time it appear that a suit commenced in equity should
have been brought as an action on the law side of the court, it shall be forth-
with transferred to the law side and be there proceeded with, with only such
alteration in the pleadings as shall be essential." Rule 23 provides: "If in a
suit in equity a matter ordinarily determinable at law arises, such matter shall
be determined in that suit according to the principles applicable, without send-
ing the case or question to the law side of the court." Rule 22 was promul-
gated to relieve the situation which §2 74a finally cured, and rule 23 was in-
tended to obviate the old practice of sending feigned issues to the law side
of the court for trial by jury. The latter does not restrict the operation of the
former.
'38 STAT. 956 (1915), 28 U. S. C. A., §397 (1928).
'McCormick, The Fusion of Law and Equity in United States Courts(1928) 6 N. C. L. Rav. 283; McBaine, Equitable Defenses to Actions at Law
in the Federal Courts (1929) 17 CALiF. L. REv. 591.
'Waldo v. Wilson, 231 Fed. 654 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916), reversed 221 Fed. 505,
and certiorari denied, 241 U. S. 673, 36 Sup. Ct. 724, 60 L. ed. 1231 (1916).
" Gatewood v. New River Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 239 Fed. 65 (C. C. A.
4th, 1916) (Plaintiff improperly sued in equity for breach of contract, but set
out that, as agent for defendant company, he was entitled to certain com-
missions for products sold. in his territory. He did not know the quantity
of the product sold nor its price. He prayed for a discovery of the facts and
for an accounting).
'3 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925) (Action at law against surety on penal
bond securing performance of contract. Defendant interposed equitable de-
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of section 274b it says: "These statutes are remedial in character, and
should be liberally construed, to the end, if possible, of a single, direct,
and speedy trial and conclusion of the issues involved in the litiga-
tion." The instant case was the first to arise in the Fourth Circuit,
after the leading case of Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Bank0 where
Chief Justice Taft construed section 274b, and in a dictum pointed
the direction in which the construction of section 274a should go. In
the remaining five cases which have arisen in the Fourth Circuit, the
court has consistently followed this liberal and progressive tendency.
Singularly enough all of the cases have arisen on the law side of the
court and the Circuit Court of Appeals has either transferred them to
equity as in the principal case ;'0 treated the writ of error as an appeal
in equity;". affirmed judgment because it appeared that the result
reached in law was what should have been reached in equity,12 or
sustained the lower court -because the complaint stated no ground for
relief either at law or in equity.' 3
The usual way to take advantage of the statute is by motion,14
but motions to amend or to introduce new evidence tending to estab-
lish an equitable case have also been construed as within the intent of
the statute.15 Also, the trial judge may, of his own motion, transfer
fense of fraud. Trial court refused to transfer case under authority of §274 b.
C. C. A. refused new trial in equity because result would be same as that
reached at law).
'260 U. S. 235, 43 Sup. Ct. 118, 67 L. ed. 202 (1922) (The defendant, in an
action at law, for money had and received claimed to be merely a stake-holder
of the money in question and offered to pay it into court when the other claim-
ants were joined. On appeal the C. C. A. treated the case as an action at law.
Reversed by the Supreme Court and remanded to C. C. A. under authority of
§274b, for consideration and determination as an appeal in equity. Through-
out, the opinion expresses an attitude much more favorable to justice for the
litigant than adherent to strict rules of procedure) ; Twist v. Prairie Oil &
Gas Co., 274 U. S. 684, 47 Sup. Ct. 755, 71 L. ed. 1297 (1927).
"Hutchings v. Caledonian Ins. Co. of Scotland, 35 F. (2d) 309 (C. C. A.
4th, 1929).
" National Surety Co. v. County Board of Education, 15 F. (2d) 993 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1926) (Surety on a contractor's bond, after default, attempted to
establish at law an equitable lien arising under the contract of suretyship. The
pleadings being proper, the C. C. A. decided the case as in equity).
" Great American Ins. Co. v. Johnson, et al., 25 F. (2d) 847 (C. C. A. 4th,
1928) (Agent of insurance company erroneously made out policy in corporate
name, instead of name of the individual owning the property insured. Prop-
erty destroyed and individual sues at law and procures judgment. The result
was correct, the method wrong); Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Glenn, Vupra
note 8.
"' Southern Surety Co. v. Plott, 28 F. (2d) 698, 701 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928).
"Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Bank, supra note 9; Fidelity and Casualty Co.
v. Glenn, supra note 8; National Surety Co. v. County Board of Education,
supra note 11.
'Hutchings v. Caledonian Ins. Co. of Scotland, supra note 10.
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the case.16 The circuit courts, however, have split on this question.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in the recent case of Amer-
ican Land Co. v. City of Keene,17 sustained the District Court's
refusal to transfer the case, "even if it were proper under section
274a," because plaintiff had made no such request to the trial court.
The court interpreted the litigant's failure to make a motion for trans-
fer as an election or waiver on his part. "This court will not compel
a litigant to transfer its action from equity to law or vice versa against
his will." Cases from the Second,' 8 Seventh,19 and Eighth20 Circuits
were relied upon. It would seem that the attitude of the Fourth Cir-
cuit is more reasonable. The court in the case of National Surety Co.
v. County Board of Education declared that on motion of parties, or
by the court ex mero mnotu a cause may be transferred from one side
of the Federal courts to the other,21 and in the principal case the
court remanded the cause for further proceedings in equity upon
argument of counsel that if a cause of action in law had not been
stated then one in equity had. The Fourth Circuit, alone, has seen fit
to resort in this connection to the act of February 26, 1919 (U. S. C.
A. section 391) which enables the circuit court to give complete
justice in the particular case by requiring, "that on the hearing of an
appeal, to give judgment after an examination of the entire record
before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or excep-
tions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." It is
submitted that such a construction is more in accord with the remark
of Chief Justice Taft: "To be sure, these sections do not create one
form of civil action as do the codes of procedure in the states, but
they manifest a purpose on the part of Congress to change from a
suit at law to one in equity and the reverse with as little delay and as
little insistence on form as possible, and are long steps toward code
practice." 2 2
T. A. UZZELL, JR.
" National Surety Co. v. County Board of Education, s'upra note 11; Great
American Ins. Co. v. Johnson et al., supra note 12.1741 F. (2d) 484 (C. C. A. 1st, 1930).
"Procter & Gamble Co. v. Powelson, 288 Fed. 299 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1923).
"Mobile Shipbuilding Co. v. Federal Bridge and Structural Co., 280 Fed.
292 (C. C. A. 7th, 1922).
" Fay v. Hill, 249 Fed. 415 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918).
2 15 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926).
Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Bank, supra note 9.
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Fraud and Deceit-Rescission of Contract-Scienter as Element
The defendant, a real estate broker, induced the plaintiff to buy a
stone veneer house by falsely representing it to be a genuine stone
house, perfectly constructed. The plaintiff sued for damages and to
rescind the contract. The jury found that the defendant had no
knowledge of the falsity of his representations. Held, that defend-
ant's want of scienter precludes a recovery on either count.'
The English View
The law of England is settled that an action of deceit cannot be
maintained unless the defendant had knowledge of the falsity of his
representation, i.e., unless the defendant was a conscious liar.2 A
particular mental attitude is the main essential of liability.8 But it is
well established that for purposes of rescission this question is wholly
immaterial. 4 The rationale of this distinction is subject to exception.
Both remedies are designed to put the parties back in statu quo,-gen-
erally and so far as money can do it, in the one case; specifically and
exactly in the other. It is difficult to see why the victim of an
innocent untruth should not be entitled to compensation, since he can
get no greater damages than he would be entitled to if the action were
for breach of warranty or contract. Furthermore, from the point of
view of the representee, the injury to him is the same, whatever the
motive of the representor was. 5
The American Views
A majority of American jurisdictions follow the English law in
both particulars,6 and the distinction has been defended by many legal
writers.7 The equity rule, requiring no scienter for the purpose of
rescission, is almost universally established,8 but there has been much
1Ebbs v. Trust Co., 199 N. C. 242, 153 S. E. 858 (1930).
'Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
'Jenks, On Negligence and Deceit in the Law of Torts (1910) 26 L. Q.
Rav. 159, 166.
' Derry v. Peek, supra note 2, 359; Re Metropolitan Coal Consumers' Assn.,
Wainwright's Case, 63 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 427 (1890); BowER, ACTIONABLE
MISREPRESENTATrON (1911) §250.5 Ibid., §§471, 472.
'Halsey v. Minn.-S. C. Land and Timber Co., 28 F. (2d) 720 (C. C. A.
4th, 1928).2 BLAcx, REcissION AND CANCELLATION (1916) §102. Distinct and sep-
arate theories. 2 LAWRENCE, EQUIrY JURISPRUDENCE (1928) §842. In equity
the emphasis shifts from wrongful act of defendant to injury to plaintiff.
2 POmEROY, EQurUIT JURISPRUDEN E (4th ed., 1918) §885. Actual fraud in
equity not necessarily immoral; also constructive fraud basis.
'BLACK, op. cit. supra note 7, §102.
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divergence and modification of the rule requiring scienter in an action
of deceit.
A minority of the American courts have completely rejected the
rule requiring conscious dishonesty as a basis for an action of deceit
and permit a recovery against a defendant who had no knowledge of
the falsity of his representation. 9 These courts have applied the rule
in equity to actions of deceit, thus making the legal and equitable con-
ception of fraud identical. 10 This is a rational and desirable result,
and gives a logical consistency to the law governing misrepresenta-
tion."'
Other jurisdictions have purported to follow the rule requiring
scienter, but have imposed liability for misrepresentations made with-
out knowledge of their falsity by such fictions as the imputation or
conclusive presumption of knowledge.' 2 While the result is desirable,
the use of fictions as a legal technique is not.' 3
Negligence as a Test of Liability
The most recent development in the law of misrepresentation is
tort liability for the negligent use of words. Words are a form of
voluntary behavior, and there is no good reason why, by analogy,
negligent words, as well as negligent deeds, should not be actionable
if injury proximately results from them.' 4 In cases of misrepre-
sentations, made without knowledge of their falsity, liability has quite
properly been based upon general principles of negligence, including
contributory negligence as a defense.' 5 This extension of the law of
'Gulf Elect. Co. v. Fried, 218 Ala. 684, 119 So. 685 (1929); Becker v.
McKinnie, 106 Kan. 426, 186 Pac. 496 (1920) ; Rosenberg v. Cyrowski, 227
Mich. 508, 198 N. W. 905 (1924), privity of contract between the parties
required; Lundy v. Hazlett, 146 Miss. 499, 112 So. 591 (1927); Donelson v.
Michelson, 104 Neb. 666, 178 S. W. 219 (1920); Bradley v. Fagula (Tex. Civ.
App.) 25 S. W. (2d) 255 (1930); Hastings v. Bain, 151 Va. 976, 145 S. E.
735 (1928); Trust Co. v. Fletcher, 152 Va. 868, 148 S. E. 785 (1929), un-
justly criticised in (1929) 16 VA. L. REv. 90, as applying the rule in equity to
an action of deceit; McDaniel v. Crahtree, 143 Wash. 168, 254 Pac. 1091(1927) ; Ohrmundt v. Spigelhoff, 175 Wis. 214, 184 N. W. 693 (1921).
(1929) 16 VA. L. REV. 90.
"Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation (1911) 24 HARv. L.
REv. 415, 434: "Consideration should be given chiefly to two things: (1) logical
consistency with itself in all parts of the law governing misrepresentation;
(2) the inherent justice of the rule proposed."
t'Fairfield Finance and Mfg. Co. v. Griffin, 144 Atl. 43 (Conn. 1928);
Watson v. Jones, 41 Fla. 241, 25 So. 678 (1899) ; Williams v. Hume, 83 Ind.
App. 608, 149 N. E. 355 (1925); Horton v. Tyree, 104 W. Va. 238, 139 S. E.
737 (1927).
GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAw (2nd ed., 1927) 30, 35.
Smith, Liability for Negligent Language (1900) 14 HAv. L. REv. 187.
'
1Weston v. Brown, 131 Atl. 141 (N. H. 1925) ; International Products Co.
v. Erie R. R., 244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 662 (1927); Note (1928) 28 COT. L.
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negligence is inherently sound.16 In at least three states, this result
may be reached under statutes providing that an action of deceit will
lie for "the assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who
has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true."'17
There is an authoritative basis for such a holding in North Caro-
line. In an action for damages, recovery was allowed for negligent
assurances that a message had been delivered, when in fact it had
not been delivered. It was expressly conceded that there was no
liability for failure to deliver the message in the particular case.'8 It
seems that this direct holding has never been followed.
The North Carolina Cases
North Carolina has never drawn the well established distinction,
discussed above, between actions at law for deceit and suits in equity
for rescission, as to the requirement of scienter. In both, the rule
requiring that the misrepresentations be made with knowledge of
their falsity has been followed.' 9 Although there are general state-
ments that scienter and intent to deceive are essential elements of
fraud, 20 it is well recognized that it is not always necessary for the
establishment of actionable fraud that a false representation should
be knowingly made. These cases fall in the following classes: (1)
Where reckless or positive assertions are made by one in a position
to know, and expected to know, to one who is not in an equal position
with reference to the misrepresentation, the one having a duty to in-
vestigate and the other having reasonable grounds for reliance. 2 1
REv. 216; Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp., 245
N. Y. 377, 157 N. E. 272 (1927) ; (1927) 41 HARv. L. REV. 105.
"
0Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty (1929) 42
HAv. L. REv. 733.
" MoNT. R v. CODE: (Choate, 1921) §7575; N. D. CoMp. LAWS ANN.(1913) §5944; S. D. REv. CODE (1919) §1293; Roper v. Noel, 32 S. D. 405,
143 N. W. 130 (1913), construing statute. Question is whether defendant had
reasonable ground for making representation.
" Laudie v. Tele. Co., 126 N. C. 431, 35 S. E. 810 (1900).
Tarault v. Seip, 158 N. C. 363, 74 S. E. 3 (1912) (Allen, J., in dissent-
ing opinion makes plea for the distinction) ; Bell v. Harrison, 179 N. C. 190,
102 S. E. 200 (1920) ; Ebbs v. Trust Co., supra note 1; Hinsdale v. Phillips,
199 N. C. 563 (1930) (No rescission for promissory misrepresentations honestly
made).
'Ebbs v. Trust Co., supra note 1.21Whitehurst v. Insurance Co., 149 N. C. 273, 62 S. E. 1067 (1908) (insur-
ance agent's statements regarding policy to an illiterate person) ; Case Thresh-
ing Mach. Co. v. Feezer, 152 N. C. 516, 67 S. E. 1004 (1910) (statements
made by agent of manufacturer) ; Briggs v. Insurance Co., 155 N. C. 73, 70
S. E. 1068 (1911) (unequal position) ; Unitype Co. v. Ashcraft, 155 N. C. 230,
71 S. E. 61 (1911) (statements by inventor) ; Pate v. Blades, 163 N. C. 267,
79 S. E. 608 (1913) (unequal position) ; Bell v. Harrison, supra note 19 (con-
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(2) Where false statements are published by the directors as to the
condition of their bank, a duty to speak the truth is imposed.22
Conclusion
In the principal case, the defendant volunteered positive assertions
of material facts, susceptible of knowledge, with the intention that
the plaintiff act upon them. He knew neither the falsity nor the truth
of his statements. Modern artifical constructions defy detection by
the inexpert examiner. The defendant was a real estate broker, an
expert, while the plaintiff was a mere purchaser of a home. The
defendant was in position to know, and the plaintiff had reasonable
grounds to rely upon the statements of the defendant as importing
verity. It is submitted that under the North Carolina decisions,
liability should have been imposed.2 3 If the North Carolina decisions
are to be so restricted, then the requirement of scienter should be
abolished completely; or, alternatively, liability should be determined
according to the general principles of negligence, for which, our court
has a precedent in its own decisions.
J. GLENN EDWARDS.
Husband and Wfe-Torts-Right of Wife to Sue
Husband for Negligent Injury
Under married women statutes1 permitting married women to
hold all their property of every description for their separate use as
though they were unmarried and permitting them to sue and be sued
as though unmarried, it was held, in an action for personal injury
from the negligent driving of an automobile, that a wife could not
recover from her husband though the action had been started before
the marriage. 2
This would be the result at common law,3 since on marriage the
woman's choses in action may be reduced to possession by the hus-
fidential relationship); Evans v. Davis, 186 N. C. 41, 118 S. E. 845 (1923);
Corley Co. v. Griggs, 192 N. C. 171, 134 S. E. 406 (1926) (scienter not neces-
sary in all cases). But cf. Peyton v. Griffin, 195 N. C. 685, 143 S. E. 525
(1925) (no positive assertion of knowledge) ; (1928) 7 N. C. L. REv. 90, as
to what constitutes reasonable reliance.
'Tate v. Bates, 118 N. C. 287, 24 S. E. 482 (1896) (knowledge presumed
by fiction) ; Solomon v. Bates, 118 N. C. 311, 24 S. E. 478 (1896) ; Houston v.
Thornton, 122 N. C. 265, 29 S. E. 827 (1898) (duty to speak truth imposed).
' Supra note 21.
'D. C. CODE (1924) §§1154, 1155.
2 Spector v. Weisman, 40 F. (2d) 792 (Ct. or App. D. C. 1930).
Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa 182 (1875) ; Phillips v. Barnet, 1 Q. B. D. 436
(1876) ; Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 309 (1877).
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band and this union in one person of the right-duty relation dis-
charges the duty as a matter of substance, and since the husband has
a right to the services 4 and earnings of the wife she could suffer no
pecuniary loss. There is also the procedural difficulty in that the
husband would be both plaintiff and defendant. The result of this
is usually expressed in the fiction of unity of person and merger of
identity.5 This is a result and not the reason, however, and was not
recognized outside of the common law. It had exceptions even there
in criminal matters. 6
The statutes in question would seem to make applicable the legal
maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa [ex. The courts have
shown a variegated inconsistency in the construction of such statutes.
Some permit a tort action for-a willful injury7 and some will permit
it for a negligent injury.8 The majority will permit a contract
action,9 but not a tort action. 10 The reason seems to be one of policy,
as either line could be logically followed. The court in the principal
'Buckley v. Collier, 1 Salk. 114 (1701) ; Warren, Husband's Right to Wife's
Services (1925) 38 HA~v. L. Rzv. 421, 622.
'1 BL. COMM. (1765) 430-433.
" Queen v. Jackson, 1 Q B. D. 671 (1891) ; State v. Oliver, 70 N. C. 60 (1874)
(assault); State v. Dowell, 106 N. C. 722, 11 S. E. 525, 8 L. R.' A. 297, 19
Am. ST. REP. 568 (1890); State v. Fulton, 149 N. C. 485, 63 S. E. 145 (1908).
" Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185 (1914) ;
Note (1914) 23 YALE L. J. 613; 12 Mica. L. REv. 473; Giliman v. Gillman, 78
N. H. 4, 95 Atl. 657 (1915), Note (1916) 1 CORN. L. Q. 289; Johnson v. John-
son, 201 Ala, 41, 77 So. 335 (1917), Note (1920) 5 CORN. L. Q. 171 (1918) 27
YALE L. J. 1081.
'Bushnell v .Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432, 44 A. L. R. 785 (1925),
Note (1926) 24 MicH. L. REv. 618; 10 MiNN. L. REv. 439; 1 Noran DAME
LAW. 195; Waite v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N. W. 475, 48 A. L. R. 276
(1926) ; Note (1926) 4 Wis. L. RZEv. 37; 26 COL. L. REV. 895; 12 IowA L. RFv.
93; 11 MiN. L. REv. 79; 11 MARaUETrs L. Rnv. 55.
'Adams v. Custis, 4 Lans. 164 (N. Y. 1870) ; Benson v. Morgan, 50 Mich.
77, 14 N. W. 705 (1883) ; Kennedy v. Knight, 174 Pa. 408, 34 Atl. 585 (1896);
DeBaun v. DeBaun, 119 Va. 85, 89 S. E. 239 (1916).10Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S. W. 628 (1915), L. R. A.
1916 B 881 (assault and battery) ; Woltman v. Woltman, 153 Minn. 217, 189
N. W. 1022 (1922). Note (1923) 21 MicH. L. REv. 473 (negligence); Newton
v. Weber, 119 Misc. 240, 196 N. Y. Supp. 113 (1922); Note (1922) 36 HARV.
L. REV. 346, 32 YALE L. J. 196 (negligence); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61,
100 So. 591 (1924) ; Note (1924) 19 ILL. L. REv. 198 (negligence) ; Allen v.
Allen; 246 N. Y. 571, 159 N. E. 656 (1927) ; Note (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 834; 28
COL. L. REV. 818. But cf. Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253,
164 N. E. 42 (1928) (permits husband's employer to be held liable, although
the husband himself is not liable and thus shows N. Y. to be interpreting
the statute on grounds of policy). Contra: Maine v. Maine & Sons Co., 198
Iowa 1278, 201 N. W. 20, 37 A. L. R. 161.
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case felt bound by an earlier decision"1 which denied the right
through fear of disturbing the harmony of the home and due to a
strict construction of the statute, since it was in derogation of the
common law. That decision left the wife with a remedy in the
divorce court and in the criminal court, but such a right is not here
presented, as this is a negligent injury and not a willful one.
North Carolina and Wisconsin have adopted the liberal construc-
tion of their married women acts and permit tort actions by the wife,
whether the injury is willful' 2 or negligent.' 3 New York, on the
other hand, under a similar statute has refused the tort action.' 4
It is submitted that the right of action should not be denied the
wife because of vague public policy based on a priori reasoning which
experience in other states has demonstrated to be unfounded. The
married women statutes are remedial in character and should be lib-
erally construed. 15 There should be no procedural limitations on
married women, as such. Instead, the right of a married woman to
recover against her husband should be governed by reasonable limita-
tions of substantive law, consistent with the relation of the parties.' 6
HuGH BRowN CAMPBELL.
Judgments--Setting Aside judgment for Neglect of Attorney
Not Residing in County of Trial
In a recent North Carolina case plaintiff instituted suit in Ashe
County against defendant who lived in Gaston County. Defendant
filed a verified answer but neither he nor his attorney appeared for
trial. Judgment was rendered against defendant. Under §600 of
"Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 Sup. Ct. 111, 54 L. ed. 1180, 30
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1153, 21 ANN. CAS. 921 (1910); Note (1913) 22 YALE L. J.
250; 9 MIcH. L. REv. 440 (It is to be noted that the remarks concerning prop-
erty actions are against the great weight of authority).
" Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 206 (1920), 181 N. C. 66, 106
S. E. 149 (1921) ; Note (1921) 19 MicH. L. REv. 659, 7 VA. L. REV. 476.
"Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N. C. 566, 118 S. E. 9, 29 A. L. R. 1479 (1923);
Note (1923) 33 YALE L. J. 315, 2 N. C. LAw REv. 113, 10 VA. L. REV. 161;
Waite v. Pierce, supra note 8; Earle v. Earle, 198 N. C. 411, 151 S. E. 884(1930).
1 "Newton v. Weber, mspra note 10. It is to be noted that the N. C. statute
does not expressly permit the wife to sue her husband in tort but such a result
is derived by construction only. N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §§454, 2506,
2513.
,BLACK, INTERPRETATION OF LAws (2d ed. 1911) 375-378.
1 See Mathewson v. Mathewson, 79 Conn. 23, 37, 63 AtL. 285, 287, 5 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 611 (1906) ; Brown v. Brown, supra note 7. For excellent treatment
of the subject see McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation(1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030.
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the Code defendant moved to set the judgment aside for excusable
neglect. The judge denied the motion upon the following finding of
facts only: that defendant employed counsel in Gaston County who
did not regularly attend the courts of Ashe County. Held, Judgment
set aside. The negligence of the attorney is not imputed to the de-
fendant who was not negligent in employing Gaston County counsel.
The filing of a verified answer alleging facts which, if true, would
constitute a meritorious defense makes such a finding unnecessary.1
The great majority of jurisdictions hold the neglect of an attor-
ney in permitting a judgment to be entered against his client to be
the neglect of the client and no ground for relief unless excusable.2
North Carolina holds the neglect of counsel in the performance of
profession duties8 not attributable to the party4 if he himself is not
negligent.5
Should a party employing counsel not regularly practicing in the
county of trial be himself held negligent and no relief granted him if
his attorney negligently permits judgment to be entered against him?
The clerk has no legal obligation to notify either the party or his
attorney that a case is set for trial.0 Because of this, the former diffi-
culty of transportation and communication caused North Carolina to
hold a party negligent for employing counsel outside the county of
trial and to refuse to set aside a judgment secured through counsel's
' Sutherland v. McLean and Faysoux, 199 N. C. 345, 154 S. E. 662 (1930).
'Note (1910) 27 L. R. A. (n. s.) 858; 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (1925)
§248; Delewski v. Delewski, 76 Ind. App. 37, 131 N. E. 228 (1921) ; Nitsche
v. City of Chicago, 280 Ill. 132, 117 N. E. 500 (1917) ; Guardia v. Guardia, 48
Nev. 230, 229 Pac. 386 (1924) ; Patterson v. Uncle Sam Oil Co., 101 Kan. 40,
165 Pac. 661 (1917) ; Carlson v. Bankers' Discount Co., 107 Ore. 686, 215 Pac.
986 (1923) ; Munroe v. Dougherty, 196 Mo. App. 124, 190 S. W. 1022 (1917).
Where defendant is his own attorney his negligence will not excuse, Pac.
Acceptance Co. v. McCue et al, 71 Mont. 99, 228 Pac. 761 (1924).
See Seawell v. Parsons Lumber Co., 172 N. C. 320, 90 S. E. 241 (1916)
(if attorney acting as a mere agent to employ another attorney-an act which
the client could perform-his neglect is that of the client).
'Grandy v. Products Co., 175 N. C. 511, 95 S. E. 914 (1918) ; Helderman
v. Hartsell Mills Co., 192 N. C. 626, 135 S. E. 627 (1926) ; Gaylord v. Berry,
169 N. C. 733, 86 S. E. 623 (1915) ; Grill v. Vernon, 65 N. C. 76 (1871) (de-
fendant is not required to examine the records to see if his attorney has filed
answer).
'A party must always give to his litigation the attention which a man of
ordinary prudence would give to his important business. Osborn v. Leach, 133
N. C. 428, 45 S. E. 783 (1903) ; Kercher v. Baker, 82 N. C. 169 (1880).
'Cahoon v. Brinkley, 176 N. C. 5, 96 S. E. 650 (1918) ; McLeod v. Gooch,
162 N. C. 122, 78 S. E. 4 (1913) ; Pulaski Oil Co. v. Conner, 62 Okla. 211, 162
Pac. 464 (1927); Baker v. Hunt & Co., 66 Okla. 42, 166 Pac. 891 (1917);
McCord v. Harrison, 207 Ala. 480, 93 So. 428 (1922) ; Dallister v. Pilkington,
185 Iowa 815, 171 N. W. 127 (1919).
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neglect.7  At other times she has not so held.8  The instant case
marshalls the former decisions and expressly abrogates the rule that
due care requires a party to employ local counsel. In view of the
present transportation and communication facilities the reason for
the former holdings fails and, under the rule that the negligence of
an attorney is not imputed to the client, it is submitted that this is a
logical and correct result. It is also submitted that the majority
holding that the negligence of the attorney is excusable only when
that of the party would be 9 is much the better rule and would save
the court much future embarrassment.
Plaintiff in the instant case did all that the law has heretofore re-
quired of him and the dissenting judge asks what more he must do
to secure a valid judgment.10 Is the answer, let him notify both the
non-resident defendant and his attorney that the case is set for trial?
This suggestion is placing an unusual burden upon plaintiff and is not
a necessary result of the case as the point the court intended to decide
was that defendant was not negligent in employing non-resident
counsel, and it did not squarely meet the issue raised by defendant's
failure to attend court himself.
The case further holds that the filing of a verified answer removes
the necessity of a specific finding of a meritorious defense. If no
answer has been filed, defendant's contentions are not before the
court and such a finding is indispensable" for unless defendant has
a valid defense it would be a vain thing to disturb the judgment al-
ready entered.12 By the weight of authority a verified answer suf-
fices for an affidavit of merits' 3 and the affidavit need show only a
'Allen v. McPherson, 168 N. C. 435, 84 S. E. 766 (1915) ; Hardware Co.
v. Buhmann, 159 N. C. 511, 75 S. E. 731 (1912) ; Ham v. Finch, 173 N. C. 72,
91 S. E. 605; McLeod v. Gooch, 162 N. C. 122, 78 S. E. 4 (1913); Hyde
County Board & Lumber Co. v. Thomasville Chair Co., 190 N. C. 437, 130 S. E.
12 (1925).
B Seawell v. Parsons Lumber Co., supra note 2; Helderman v. Hartsell Mills
Co., supra note 3; Osborn v. Leach, supra note 4; Sutherland v. McLean, 199
N. C. 345, 351, ("To follow the decisions now existing, it would be necessary
to possess the double head of Janus, and such trancsendent qualification ought
not to be required of trial judges.")
'See note 1. In McCord v. Harrison and Stringer, 207 Ala. 480, 93 So.
428 (1922) the court reaches an opposite conclusion from the instant case on
similar facts.
20 Sutherland v. McLean, supra note 7, at 353.
'Bowie v. Tucker, 197 N. C. 671, 150 S. E. 200 (1929) ; School v. Peirce,
163 N. C. 424, 79 S. E. 687 (1913).
34 C. J. Judgments, §550.
1 3Maden v. Dunbar et al, 52 N. D. 74, 201 N. W. 991 (1924) ; Huebner v.
Farmers Ins. Co., 71 Iowa 30, 32 N. W. 13 (1887) ; State v. District Court of
Second Judicial District, 38 Mont. 415, 100 Pac. 207 (1909) ; Eherhart v.
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prima facie meritorious defense, which cannot be controverted by
counter-affidavits. 14 It might be argued that the judge having found
no meritorious defense is presumed to have had before him facts
sufficient to negative it. 15 The answer, however, speaks for itself
as a part of the record of which the court will take judicial notice' 0
and from which the court will review the conclusions of the judge.17
The cases cited in the dissent on this point are all cases in which
no answer had been filed or no facts at all were found relative to
the negligence.' 8 While good practice may require the judge to set
out findings relative to a meritorious defense, any other holding, it
is submitted, would have been over technical and not in harmony
with the highly remedial purpose of §600.19
SUSIE SHARP.
Libel-Negotiable Instruments-Injury to Business
Reputation by Altering Check
Plaintiff, a corporation operating 2 general merchandise store,
gave defendant, a wholesale meat packing corporation, a post-dated
check for $54.99 to settle an account, as agreed. Defendant sent the
check in for collection with the date altered, making it payable at
once. The check was returned by the bank due to insufficient funds.
The plaintiff, having deposited enough to pay the check, sued the
defendant for damage to its credit and business reputation caused by
defendant's negligent, wanton, and willful premature presentation of
the check causing the bank to give false information that the plaintiff
had drawn a check without funds. A jury verdict of $2,000 was
affirmed, the plaintiff being entitled to such substantial damages as
would compensate for the injury as well as such punitive damages
as were proper punishment for such willful wrong.'
This case is without precedent or direct authority and was decided
by analogy to suits against banks for the wrongful dishonor of cus-
tomers' checks. The situations, while generally similar, are different
Salogar et al, 71 Cal. App. 290, 235 Pac. 86 (1925). 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS(1925) §286.
" 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, §289; 34 C. J. Judgements, §571 (3).
"Holcomb v. Holcomb, 192 N. C. 505, 135 S. E. 332 (1926).
"123 C. J., Evidence, §1918; N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §1412; Wil-
son v. Beaufort County Lumber Co., 131 N. C. 164, 42 S. E. 565 (1902).
'T Norton v. McLaurin, 125 N. C. 185, 34 S. E. 269 (1898).
" Sutherland v. McLean, supra note 7, at page 352.
S(1927) 5 N. C. L. REv. 269.
'St. Charles Mercantile Co. v. Armour & Co., 153 S. E. 473 (S. C. 1930).
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in the respect that the latter cases are usually brought for injury to
plaintiff's credit with the company taking the check in payment while
here the injury is a loss of credit principally with the bank. The
wrongful act of the defendant resulted in a tort2 similar to slander
of title or disparagement of goods, in that it injured business repu-
tation by injuring credit. The bank was an innocent agent, and the
defendant's act was the proximate cause of the false information.
The plaintiff was blameless in issuing a post-dated check.3 Al-
though it is held by some jurisdictions that a post-dated check is the
same as if it hadn't been issued until the date thereof,4 the weight
of authority is that a post-dated check is not only a valid but a nego-
tiable instrument before its date.5 A post-dated check raises a pre-
sumption that the maker has an inadequate fund in the bank at the
time of giving the check but that he will have a sufficient deposit at
the date of presentation.8
A merchant or trader having a check wrongfully dishonored by a
bank is entitled to substantial damages7 without proof of actual loss
or damage, the injury to the credit and commercial standing of the
former being presumed.8 Where the non-payment is actuated by
fraud, gross negligence, or oppression, punitive damages also may be
'Winthrop v. Alien, 116 S. C. 388, 108 S. E. 153 (1921) ; Jackson v. Cham-
bers, 24 Ga. App. 285, 100 S. E. 659 (1919); Rich v. New York Cent. & H.
R. R. R., 87 N. Y. 382 (1882) ; Oliver v. Perkins et al., 92 Mich. 304, 52 N. W.
609 (1892).
'State v. Winter, 98 S. C. 294, 82 S. E. 419 (1914); State v. Crawford,
198 N. C. 522, 152 S. E. 504 (1930) ; Neidlinger v. State, 17 Ga. App. 811, 88
S. E. 687 (1916). Contra: People v. Bercovitz, 163 Cal. 636, 126 Pac. 479,
43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 667 (1912); State v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588, 207 Pac. 838,
23 A. L. R. 453 (1922) ; People v. Westerdahl, 316 Ill. 86, 146 N. E. 737 (1925).
"Merchants' & Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Clifton Mfg. Co., 56 S. C. 320, 33
S. E. 750 (1890) ; ln re Brown, 4 Fed. Cas. No. 1985, 2 Story 502, 6 Law Rep.
508 (1843) ; Symonds v. Riley, 188 Mass. 470, 74 N. E. 926 (1905).
'American Nat. Bank v. Wheeler, 45 Cal. App. 118, 187 Pac. 128 (1920);
Wilson v. McEachern, 9 Ga. App. 584, 71 S. E. 946 (1911) ; Albert v. Hoff-
man, 64 Misc. 87, 117 N. Y. Supp. 1043 (1909); Breckenridge, Negotiability
of Post-dated Checks (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1063; Premature Payment of Post-
dated Checks (1930) 64 U. S. L. IZEv. 297.
'Lovell v. Eaton, 99 Vt. 255, 133 Ati. 742 (1925) ; State v. Crawford, supra
note 3; Clarke Nat. Bank v. Albion Bank, 52 Barb. 592 (N. Y. 1868).
"Wilson v. Palmetto Nat. Bank, 113 S. C. 508, 101 S. E. 841 (1920). "The
authorities agree that the plaintiff is entitled to something more than nominal
damages; but that the recovery should be temperate in amount." J. M. James
Co. v. Bank, 105 Tenn. 1, 58 S. W. 261, 51 L. R. A. 255, 80 Am. St. Rep. 857
(1900) "Substantial, though temperate, damages, measured by all the facts
in the case"; Svendson v. Bank, 64 Minn. 40, 65 N. W. 1086, 58 Am. St. Rep.
522, 31 L. R. A. 552 (1896). "General compensatory damages."
'Lorick v. Palmetto Bank & Trust Co., 74 S. C. 185, 54 S. E. 206 (1906);
Third Nat. Bank of St. Louis v. Ober, 178 Fed. 678, 102 C. C. A. 178 (C. C. A.
8th, 1910) ; Levin v. Savings Bank, 133 La. 492, 63 So. 601 (1913).
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awarded. 9 The facts of this case tend to show that some agent of
the defendant acted with a fraudulent motive or else with such gross
negligence as to display a reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights.
In view of the aggravated nature of the offense of altering the check
and the fact that the altered instrument operated to charge plaintiff
with the crime of issuing a check without funds, it is submitted that
the jury verdict may be upheld, although the actual loss to the plain-
tiff through loss of credit and damage to business reputation prob-
ably was slight under the circumstances.' 0
TRAVIS BROWN.
Marriage and Divorce-Annulment-Marriage in Jest
Infant plaintiff brought an equitable petition by her next friend
for the purpose of annuling her marriage to the defendant. She
alleged that she was fifteen years old and that the defendant was
nineteen, and that both resided with and were dependent upon their
respective parents. While attending a dinner dance, in a spirit of
fun, braggadocio, and levity, the parties began to dare each other to
get married. They drove across the state line into Alabama, procured
a license from a probate judge by means of falsifications by the de-
fendant as to their ages, and were married. Plaintiff alleged that
she returned home and had never lived with the defendant. De-
fendant entered a general demurrer for want of equity and on the
ground that the court of equity "was without jurisdiction or power
to annul a marriage under any circumstances." Held, demurrer
sustained.'
Two questions are presented in the case. The first, whether or
not a court of equity has jurisdiction to annul a marriage, had never
been adjudicated in Georgia and was left open by the court. There
are many cases which have decided that equity has such jurisdiction.
12 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING (5th ed., 1917) §458. See Winkler v.
Citizens' State Bank, 89 Kan. 279, 131 Pac. 597, 598 (1913); American Nat.
Bank v. Morey, 113 Ky. 857, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 658, 69 S. W. 759, 760, 101 Am.
ST. REP. 379, 58 L. R. A. 956 (1902) ; McCormick, Some Phases of the Doctrine
of Exemplary Damages (1930) 8 N. C. L. Rzv. 129.
" The plaintiff was insolvent at the time of the alleged occurrences leading
to the suit. It was not proved that the defendant's action contributed any sub-
stantial part to the plaintiff's going into bankruptcy thereafter.
'Hand v. Berry, 154 S. E. 239 (Ga. 1930).
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Some of them hold that the power is inherent,2 others that it is con-
ferred upon the courts by statute,3 and still others that it is a part
of the general power of a court of equity over contracts. 4
The second question presented is whether or not on the facts the
marriage could be set aside if jurisdiction existed. The law of the
place of contracting governs with regard to matrimonial capacity of
parties as well as with respect to the manner or form of solemniza-
tion or annulment.5 It appears that the parties were capable of con-
tracting a valid marriage in Alabama.6 The fraud of defendant in
falsifying their ages in order to secure a license without the written
consent of their parents did not render the marriage voidable on
that ground.7 But, granting the capacity of the parties and assum-
ing that the court had jurisdiction, it held that the facts did not con-
stitute grounds for annulment. The basis for the decision is that the
state has decreed that when capable parties consent to the pronounce-
ment of a certain ceremony by the proper official that they are united
as man and wife. A very strong majority opposes this view on the
ground that it is real consent to assume the obligations and rights of
that status which validates the contract.8 The words are the ex-
ternal manifestation of intention, but mere words without any inten-
tion corresponding to them cannot make a marriage or any other civil
contract, unless they are justifiably and reasonably taken at their face
value.9 The legal forms are not a substitute for legal consent, they
are but modes of declaring and substantiating it.10 Actual mutual
consent and a bona fide agreement are fundamental and essential
2Meredith v. Shakespeare, 96 W. Va. 229, 122 S. E. 520 (1924) ; Dorgelah
v. Murtha, 92 Misc. Rep. 279, 156 N. Y. Supp. 181 (1915).
'Johnson v. Kincade, 37 N. C. 470 (1843).
'Corder v. Corder, 141 Md. 114, 117 Atl. 119 (1922) ; Clark v. Field, 13 Vt.
460 (1841).
'Powell v. Powell, 282 Ill. 357, 118 N. W. 786 (1918) ; Great Northern v.
Johnson, 254 Fed. 683 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918).8Ala. Code (1923) §8999. But see: Quigg v. Quigg, 42 Misc. Rep. 48, 85
N. Y. Supp. 550 (1903) ; Kellog v. Kellog, 122 Misc. Rep. 734, 203 N. Y. Supp.
757 (1924); Swenson v. Swenson, 179 Wis. 536, 192 N. W. 70 (1923).
'Smith v. Smith, 205 Ala. 503, 88 So. 577 (1921) ; Bays v. Bays, 105 Misc.
Rep. 492, 174 N. Y. Supp. 212 (1918) ; Fodor v. Kunie, 92 N. J. Eq. 301, 112
AtI. 598 (1920).
"Crouch v. Wartenberg, 86 W. Va, 664, 104 S. E. 117 (1920) ; Note (1921)
11 A. L. R. 215.
'McClurg v. Terry, 21 N. J. Eq. 225 (1870) ; Regina v. Millis, 10 Clark &
F. 534 (1844).
"1 BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION (1921) §§296 and 337;
SPENCER, DOMESTIC RErATIONS (1923) §§37 and 82.
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elements," without them the marriage is voidable,12 unless it is rati-
fied by consummation. 13
The cases preponderate in favor of annulment of marriages con-
tracted in jest.14 Social policy dictates that a contract of such im-
portance to the race shall not be unintentionally assumed. Where it
appears that the parties never had the intention of fulfilling the
obligations of the contract, it would seem to be more just to both the
state and to the parties to restore them to statu qua.
C. E. REITZEL.
Negligence-Automobiles--Duty of Guest
Two actions (consolidated by consent) were brought against the
owner of an automobile and his wife, who was driving, to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained by a guest, and caused by
the alleged negligence of the driver while operating the car. Judg-
ment against the wife was sustained, the court holding that the
owner was relieved of any liability by the finding of the jury that
his wife was not operating the car as his agent. Testimony of cau-
tion by the guest to the driver was held competent on the question
of the driver's negligence.'
The above statement of the owner's liability raises serious doubt
in view of the court's previous adoption of the "family purpose"
doctrine.2 There is no indication that the court is overruling the
previous holding of modifying the doctrine, although the language
would seem to restore the owner's liability to an agency basis.3
The testimony as to the warning is admissible either to show a
compliance with the guest's duty to warn, if any,4 or as evidence
tending to show negligence on the part of the driver., Such a state-
' Crouch v. Wartenberg, supra note 9.
" McClurg v. Terry, spra note 10; Hall v. Hail, 24 Times L. P, 756
( 8rooke v. Brooke, 60 Md. 524 (1883) ; Macri v. Macri, 164 N. Y. Supp.
112, 177 App. Div. 292 (1917); Arado v. Arado, 281 Ill. 123, 117 N. E. 816,
4 A. L. R. 28 (1917); Martin v. Otis, 233 Mass. 491, 124 N. E. 294 (1919);
Americus Co. v. Coleman, 16 Ga. App. 17, 84 S. E. 493 (1915).
14 Note (1921) 11 A. L. R. 215.
'Teasley etal. v. Burwell et al., 199 N. C. 18, 153 S. E. 607 (1930).
'Goss v. Williams, 196 N. C. 213, 145 S. E. 119 (1928); (1927) 5 N. C.
L. Rav. 252; (1928) 6 N. C. L. IEv. 78; McCall, The Family Automobile
(1930) 8 N. C. L. Rsv. 256.
'Linville v. Nissen, 162 N. C. 96, 77 S. E. 1096 (1913) ; Tyree v Tudor,
183 N. C. 340, 111 S. E. 714 (1922); Watts v. Lefler, 190 N. C. 722, 130 S. E.
630 (1925).
'McAdd v. Shea, 10 La. App. 733, 122 So. 879 (1929).
'Hiller v. De Sautels, 169 N. E. 494 (Mass. 1929).
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ment is not hearsay, for it is offered, not to prove the truth of the
facts asserted, but merely to show that the assertion was made.
The rulings relative to the duty which a guest in an automobile
must discharge to entitle him to sue his host or a negligent third
party,6 range all the way from holding that he must exercise a de-
gree of care coextensive with that of the driver7 to holding that he
must remain silent and passive.8 Between these two extremes lie
more moderate interpretations of the duty to exercise ordinary care
under the circumstances. 9 Opposite theories exist as to his duty to
maintain a lookout. A New York holding10 denies recovery to a
guest who failed to keep a lookout at a railroad crossing, while an
Oregon case11 permits a guest to recover, although he gave the driver
a mistaken direction. The application of this question is often re-
solved into the issue of whether the guest may read,1 2 sleep,13 or
converse.14 Even though the duty to keep a lookout may be denied,
'McGeever v. O'Byrne, 203 Ala. 266, 82 So. 508 (1919).
'Read v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 219 N. Y. 660, 114 N. E. 1081(1915).
" Alost v. J. Moock Wood and Drayage Co., Inc., 10 La, App. 57, 120 So.
791 (1929); Lawrason v. Richard, 129 So. 250 (La. 1930); Bolton v. Wells,
225 N. W. 791 (N. D. 1929); Telling Belle Vernon Co. v. Krenz, 34 Ohio
App. 499, 171 N. E. 357 (1928); Schlossstein v. Bernstein, 293 Pa. 245, 142
Atl. 324 (1928); Yturria v. Everton, 4 S. W. (2d) 210 (Tex. 1928); see
Southern Pacific Co. v. Wright, 248 Fed. 261, 264 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918).
' Wicker v. Scott, 29 F. (2d) 807 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928) ; McDermott v. Sibert,
218 Ala. 670, 119 So. 681 (1928) ; Graves v. Jewel Tea Co., 23 S. W. (2d) 972(Ark. 1930); Switzler v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 285 Pac. 918 (Cal.
1930) ; Fairchild v. Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry. Co., 250 Mich. 252, 230 N. W. 167(1930); Lewis v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 17 S. W. (2d) 359 (Mo.
1929); Hocking Valley Ry. Co. v. Wykle, 122 Ohio St. 391, 171 N. E. 860
(1930).
"Read v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., supra note 7. Accord: Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co. v. Wellons' Adm'r., 154 S. E. 575 (Va. 1930).
Peters v. Johnson, 264 Pac. 459 (Ore. 1928).
Kilpatrick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 290 Pa. 288, 138 Atl. 830
(1927) (Held not to be contributory negligence for guest to be reading a
paper, though the automobile was on the trolley track).
Oppenheim v. Barkin, 159 N. E. 628 (Mass. 1928) (Held contributory
negligence for guest to sleep, knowing driver had been without sleep for a long
time); Krueger v. Krueger, 197 Wis. 588, 222 N. W. 784 (1929) (same, know-
ing driver had been subjected to extreme hardships). But in the absence of
special circumstances it is generally held that the mere fact that the guest
was asleep does not constitute contributory negligence. Bushnell v. Bushnell,
103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432, 44 A. L. R. 785 (1925); McAndrews v. Leonard,
134 Atl. 710 (Vt. 1926).
" Semellie v. Southern Pacific Co., 269 Pac. 657 (Cal. 1928) (guest held
contributorily negligent when he said at railroad crossing, "it's all clear; let's
go," and an accident ensued); McAdd v. Shea, supra note 4 (statement by
guest, "it is pretty fast for a new car," held to relieve him of contributory neg-
ligence) ; Peters v. Johnson, supra note 11 (guest allowed to recover although
he mistakenly directed driver).
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there is a clear duty to warn of perceived dangers 1 or violations of
the law,18 unless the driver appears to be aware of the same or striv-
ing to avoid them.' 7
In actions by a guest against the host, the guest assumes the risk
of defects, not known to the host.' 8 In actions either against the
host or negligent third parties, the guest assumes the dangers inci-
dent to the known incompetency or inexperience' 9 or habits2 0 of the
driver. All the authorities are to the effect that it is contributory
negligence, precluding recovery, for one to ride knowingly with an
intoxicated driver, if he is injured as a result of the driver's negli-
gence.2 ' Whether or not the passenger knew of the driver's con-
dition is a question for the jury.22 A guest is also bound by his
acquiescence in obvious negligence or recklessness in handling the
car,2 3 and he assumes the risks naturally incident to the purpose and
character of the trip.24
The various factual aspects which bring up the general question
suggest the inadvisability of crystallized rules. It is impractical to
try to limit the duty of a guest to exercise due care under the cir-
cumstances by any fixed rules of law. To attempt to lay down any
rule requiring a guest to give warning would undoubtedly prove in-
'Minnich v. Easton Transit Co., 267 Pa. 200, 110 Atl. 273, 18 A. L. R,
296 (1920) ; Kilpatrick v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., supra note 12.
"Renner v. Tone, Rec'r., 273 Pa. 10, 116 Atl. 512 (1922) (driving on wrong
side of street against the current of traffic) ; Wagenbauer v. Schwinn, 285 Pa.
128, 131 Atl. 699 (1926) (driving recklessly and in disregard of circum-
stances) ; Morningstar v. Northeast Pennsylvania R. Co., 290 Pa. 14, 137 Atl.
800 (1927) (crossing railroad track without stopping) ; Alperdt v. Paige, 292
Pa. 1, 140 Atl. 555 (1928) (driving in front of a rapidly approaching auto-
mobile which has the right of way).
'United States Can Co. v. Ryan, 39 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930);
Jerko v. Buffalo R. & P. Ry. Co., 275 Pa. 459, 119 Atl. 543 (1923).
"Lewellyn v. Shott, 155 S. E. 115 (W. Va. 1930); O'Shea v. Lavoy, 175
Wis. 456, 185 N. W. 525, 20 A. L. R. 1008 (1921).
"Cleary v. Eckhart, 191 Wis. 114, 210 N. W. 267, 51 A. L. R. 576 (1926);
Thomas v. Steppert, 228 N. W. 513 (Wis. 1930).
" Livaudias v. Black, 127 So. 129 (La. 1930).
'Lynn v. Goodwin, 170 Cal. 112, 148 Pac. 927, L. R. A. 1915 E, 588
(1915) ; Kirmse v. Chicago, T. H. & S. E. Ry. Co., 73 Ind. App. 537, 127 N. E.
837 (1920); Winston Adm'r. v. City of Henderson, 179 Ky. 220, 200 S. W.
330, L. R. A. 1918 C, 646 (1918) ; Jensen v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. ct al.,
133 Wash. 208, 233 Pac. 635 (1925). To the effect that voluntary intoxication
does not relieve of contributory negligence, see Schwartz v. Johnson, 152 Tenn.
586 , 280 S. W. 32 (1926).
"Fitzpatrick v. Civitis, 139 At]. 639 (Conn. 1927).
' Joyce v. Brockett, 237 N. Y. 561, 143 N. E. 743 (1923) ; Hill v. Philadel-
phia Rapid Transit Co., 271 Pa. 232, 114 Atl. 634 (1921) ; Krause v. Hall, 195
Wis. 565, 217 N. W. 290 (1928).
, Sommerfield v. Flury, 198 Wis. 163, 223 N. W. 408 (1929).
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advisable. Experience tells us that back seat suggestions as to the
handling of a car are disconcerting and irritating to the driver (more
so as between husband and wife). Indeed this is one case where
silence is generally golden. At present the cases seem to make no
distinction between the liability of a host and that of a third party.
The burdens of generosity should not be so great. It is submitted
that the legislature should relieve the situation by a statutory change,
and thereby relieve the host of part of his present burden. 25
MILLS SCOTT BENTON.
Procedure and Practise-Relation Between Survival and
Wrongful Death Statutes Where Death
Follows Injury
Two recent decisions construing the North Carolina survival'
and wrongful death 2 statutes have aroused speculation as to what
actions for personal injuries survive to the personal representative.
In both cases the decedent was injured by the defendant's alleged
negligence. In the state case3 decedent died before the termination
of his suit, but did not die from the injuries sustained by the de-
fendant's negligence. In the federal case 4 the jury found that the
decedent was injured by the defendant's negligence, and awarded
damages, but found, also, that the decedent's death was not caused
by the injuries inflicted by the defendant's negligence. In these cases
it was held that the cause of action for personal injuries not resulting
in death survived.
At common law no right of action for personal injuries survived
:he death of the injured or injuring party. Our survival statute5
provides that all causes of action survive except those specifically
declared not to survive. Since the amendment 6 of our survival stat-
ute, it is now clear that if the injured party dies without a recovery,
compromise, or settlement, and not as a result of the defendant's
negligence, the cause of action survives. 7 Also, the cause of action
'For discussion of proposed statute to meet this situation, see p. 47.1 N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §§159, 162, 163.2 Ibid., §§160, 161.
'Fuquay, Adm'x v. A. & W. R. R. Co., 199 N. C. 499 (1930).
'James Baird Co., Inc., v. Boyd, 41 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
'Supra note 1.
REv. (1905) §157 (2), as amended by N. C. Pun. LAvs (1915), c. 38.
Infra note 16.
'Fuquay, Adm'x v. A. & W. R. R. Co., supra note 3; cf. Bolick v. R. R.
Co., 138 N. C. 370, 50 S. E. 689 (1905).
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survives, under like circumstances, against the personal representative
of a deceased defendant.8
The question of interest is raised by the situation in which the
injured party dies from the injuries sustained through the defend-
ant's negligence. Does the personal representative have one cause of
action for the decedent's injury and suffering under the survival stat-
ute, and another cause of action for the wrongful death under the
wrongful death statute ?9 It is settled in this state and by the majority
opinion in this country, and in England' 0 that a recovery, compro-
mise, or settlement, prior to the death of the injured party will bar
an action by the personal representative for the wrongful death. The
reason for this rule is that the specific wording of the statute requires
that the injured party have a cause of action against the defendant
at the time of the former's death." But, under the strict wording
of our statutes, why should not a cause of action for unrecompensed
injuries survive when there is a cause of action for the wrongful
death. In some jurisdictions where there are both survival and
wrongful death statutes, two separate causes of action exist to the
personal representative and may be prosecuted concurrently. 12 The
Federal Employers Liability Act provides for two separate causes of
action, and treats them as capable of being joined by the personal
representative.' 3 Our court says that our law differs from the fed-
eral law on this subject 14 and holds that after the injured party's
death there is only one cause of action, and that is for the wrongful
death. This ruling seems to be based on decisions before the change
of the statute. 15
It would appear that the North Carolina statute of the survival
of personal injury causes is independent of the wrongful death stat-
'Tonkins, Adm'r v. Cooper, 187 N. C. 570, 122 S. E. 294 (1924) ; cf. Watts
v. Vanderbilt, 167 N. C. 567, 83 S. E. 813 (1914).9 Supra note 2.
"
0Edwards, Adm'r v. Interstate Chemical Co., 170 N. C. 551, 87 S. E. 635,
L. R. A. 1916D, 121 (1915); Littlewood v. The Mayor, Etc., 89 N. Y. 24, 42
AM. REP. 271 (1882); Sou. Bell Tele. Co. v. Cassin, 111 Ga. 575, 36 S. E. 881,
50 L. R. A. 694 (1900); Thompson v. R. R. Co., 97 Tex. 590, 80 S. W. 990
(1904) ; Mich. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 33 Sup. Ct. 192, 57
L. ed. 417 (1912) ; Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U. S. 335, 48 Sup. Ct. 541, 72 L. ed.
906 (1927) ; Read v. Great East. R. R. Co., L. R. 3 C. Q. B. 555 (1868).
'Edwards v. Chem. Co., and Mellon v. Goodyear, supra note 10.
"Sdu. Bell Tele. Co. v. Cassin, supra note 10; Mahoning Valley R. R. Co.
v. Van Alstine, 77 Ohio St. 395, 83 N. E. 601, 14 L. R. A. (n. s.) 893 (1908).
' St. Louis, Iron Mtn. & Sou. R. R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648, 35 Sup. Ct.
704, 59 L. ed. 1160 (1914).
" Cobia, Adm'x v. A. C. L. R. R. Co., 188 N. C. 487, 125 S. E. 18 (1924).
" Gurley v. Power Co., 172 N. C. 690, 696, 90 S. E. 943 (1916).
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ute, and, if the cause of action not resulting in death should survive,
that the cause of action resulting in death should also survive.' 6
This is apparently the view of the court in the principal federal
case' 7 and it is submitted as correct.
JAMES A. WILLIAMS.
Workmen's Compensation-Measure of Compensation
for Loss of Member
In the workmen's compensation laws of various jurisdictions are
found provisions for temporary total disability caused by industrial
accidents and for specific injuries,-such as loss of fingers. For total
disability of temporary or permanent character it is uniformly stipu-
lated that the compensation shall run during such liability, or for
the statutory period.' The three types of statute dealing with spe-
cific injuries are: (1) Those which provide that compensation for
specific injuries shall "be in lieu of all other compensation," 2 or its
practical equivalent, that the compensation period shall begin to
run from the date of the injury ;3 (2) Those which provide that com-
pensation under one section of the law shall be in addition to other
compensation;4 (3) Those which simply set up a scale of compen-
sation, or indemnity, and leave the court to work out a proper inter-
pretation of the whole statute as best it can.5
Court decisions interpreting these provisions of the statutes like-
wise fall into fairly well defined groups. One group of courts holds
that during the healing period while the workman is unable to work,
he may recover for total disability, and then, when he has returned
to work, he is to receive the full statutory amount for the specific
"Prior to the amendment of REv. (1905) §157 (2) by N. C. PUB. LAws
(1915) c. 38, striking out the clause, "where such injury does not cause the
death of the injured party," the cause of action for personal injuries abated,
and only the cause of action for the wrongful death remained. Bolick v. R. R.
Co., stepra note 7; MCINToSH, N. C. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES
(1929) §424.
"James Baird Co., Inc. v. Boyd, supra note 4.
IN. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill's 1923) c. 66, §15; IowA CODE (1927) §1394;
N. C. PuB. LAWS (1929) c. 120, §29.
' GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) §3154 (32); Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1922)
§4899.
'IOWA CODE (1927) §1396.
'MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 152, §36; CLO. ANN. STAT. (Courtright's
Mills, 1927) §1853.
'N. C. PuB. LAWS (1929) c. 120, §31; N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, Supp.
1929) §8081 (MM).
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injuries sustained.6 A second group holds that he may recover total
disability compensation only until the extent of the specific injury is
determined, and thereafter for the full amount provided for such
injury.7 A third rule is that under no circumstances may an employee
who has suffered a specific injury provided for by the statute recover
more than the bare amount thus stipulated.8 Still other courts hold
that while in the case of such specific injury the statutory period of
compensation may not be lengthened, the employee is entitled to total
disability compensation until such time as the extent of the specific
injury can be determined, the number of weeks such compensation
was received to be deducted from the statutory period during which
compensation for the specific injury was to run.9 Thus a man who
is disabled for nine weeks before it is determined that amputation
of a finger is necessary will, under a statute which provides that
compensation for the loss of a finger shall be a certain percentage of
his wages for thirty-five weeks, receive compensation for total dis-
ability during nine weeks and for the loss of his finger during the
remaining twenty-six weeks of the statutory period. The New York
Court of Appeals and at least one Federal Court hold that even when
there are several injuries arising out of the same accident the em-
ployee may recover only for that injury for which compensation runs
over the longest period of time.10
It is impossible to tell by reading the statute of a given state what
interpretation will be given to it by the court. Under identical stat-
utes the holdings of various courts differ radically." Under statutes
that are not, on the face of them, at all alike the rule laid down by
different courts is sometimes exactly the same. 12 In one instance a
' Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lilly, 140 Atl. 215 (Md. 1925); Gobble v.
Clinch Valley Lumber Co., 141 Va. 303; Western Steel Erecting Co. v. Luck-
enbill, 287 Pac. 724 (Okla. 1930).
'Addison v. Wood, 207 Mich. 319, 174 N. W. 149 (1919); Poast v. Omaha
Merchants' Express and Transfer Co., 107 Neb. 516, 186 N. W. 540 (1922);
Phillip's Case, 123 Me. 501, 124 Atl. 211 (1924).
' Fame Armstrong Laundry Co. v. Brooks, 226 Ky. 25, 10 S. W. (2nd) 479
(1928); Georgia Casualty Co. v. Jones, 156 Ga. 664, 119 S. E. 721 (1923);
Moses v. National Union Coal Co., 194 Iowa 819, 184 S. W. 746 (1921).
'Jack v. Knoxville Fertilizer Co., 154 Tenn. 292, 289 S. W. 500 (1926).
" Texas Employer's Insurance Association v. Sheppeard, 32 F. (2d) 300
(S. D. Tex. 1929); Marhoffer v. Marhoffer, 220 N. Y. 543, 116 N. E. 372
(1917).
'Georgia Casualty Co. v. Jones, supra note 8; Gobble v. Clinch Valley
Lumber Co., supra note 6; GA. ANN. CoDa (Michie, 1926); §3154 (32); VA.
CODE ANN. (1924) §1887 (32).
"Hardin v. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co., 147 La. 453, 85 So. 202 (1920) ; Wirth
Lang Co. v. Mece, 211 Ky. 520, 277 S. W. 834 (1925); Ky. STAT. (Carroll,
1922) §4899; LA. PuB. LAWS (1922) act 43, §(d).
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court modified its former ruling, stating that it did so in order to
conform to the rule of another state which had an identical statute.
As a matter of fact the rule in that other state was, at that time
diametrically opposite to the rule then being promulgated. 13
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in attempting to construe
an ambiguous statute which merely sets up one scale of compensation
for total disability in one section and another scale for specific in-
juries in another section of the law lays down the rule that the pro-
visions of these sections are not mutually exclusive, and holds that
recovery may be had consecutively under each of them.
In a recent case it has held that when an employee sustained a
badly lacerated hand, necessitating immediate amputation of fingers,
he was entitled to compensation for total disability during the healing
period, and to full compensation for the loss of his fingers after the
wounds had healed.' 4 It is submitted that this is a sound result.
Under any other interpretation of the law it is quite possible that in
case of a long healing period after the extent of the specific injuries
has been determined, the statutory period will have run before the
injured man is able to return to work. In such case the employee
would not only lose a good share of his earnings over a long period
of time but would return to industry without a cent of indemnity
for the injury that was permanent in character-a result that could
hardly have been within the contemplation of the legislature in pass-
ing the act. There is no indication within the statute itself that it
was intended that the two sections construed in the principal case
should be mutually exclusive. The decision serves well what seems
to be the underlying purpose of all Workmen's Compensation Laws.
ALLEN LANGSTON.
Workmen's Compensation-Recovery for Injuries
Resulting from Horseplay
The North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act' provides that
compensable injuries are only those injuries "by accident arising out
of and in the course of the employment." An employee was injured
by the accidental discharge of a gun in the hands of a fellow-em-
ployee. The injured man took no part in the "horseplay," but was
' Gobble v. Clinch Valley Lumber Co., supra note 6.
"Rice v. Denny Roll and Panel Co., 199 N. C. 154, 154 S. E. 69 (1930).
'N. C. PuB. LAws (1929)'c. 120, §2 (f); N. C. ANx. CODE (Michie, Supp.
1929) §8081 (i).
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at the time busily at work. Held, the injury arose out of the em-
ployment, and recovery allowed.2
When an employee at work sustains an injury due to some play-
ful act of his fellow-employees, he is the victim of "horseplay."8
"With practical uniformity, the courts hold, both under the English
act and also under the various American statutes, that an injury
occasioned by some sportive act of a fellow-workman does not arise
out of the employment within the meaning of the governing statute,
and consequently that its compensatory provisions are not thereby
invoked. ' 4 Upon this reasoning, recovery has been denied in a great
many instances.5 In some cases denying a right to compensation, it
has been regarded as immaterial that the injured party took no part
in the horseplay.6 But in a number of cases, the right to compen-
sation has been sustained, where an employee who was injured
through horseplay took no part in the proceedings, but was attending
to his duties.7 In a few instances, compensation has been allowed
2 Chambers v. Oil Co., 199 N. C. 28, 153 S. E. 594 (1930).
'(1930) 18 CALIF. L. REv. 560.
'Re Loper, 64 Ind. App. 571, 116 N. E. 324 (1917).
'Coronado Beach Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 682, 158 Pac. 212 (1916) (Em-
ployee known to co-workers to be very ticklish. Tickled in ribs by one of
them, while he was carrying d bucket downstairs.) ; Great Western Power Co.
v. Industrial Accident Commission, 187 Cal. 295, 201 Pac. 931 (1921) Employee
while in performance of duties struck on leg by fellow-workmen who were
wrestling.); Tarpper v. Weston-Mott Co., 200 Mich. 275, 166 N. W. 857
(1918) (Plaintiff while working was injured by air hose used by fellow-em-
ployee in spirit of play.); Federal Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc.
Com. of California, 187 Cal. 284, 201 Pac. 920 (1921) (Employee sweeping
floor struck in eye by grape thrown by fellow-employee.) ; Lee's Case, 240
Mass. 473, 134 N. E. 268 (1922) (Employee standing in line to punch time
clock, pushed down by other employees indulging in horseplay.); Hulley v.
Moosbrugger, 88 N. J. L. 161, 95 Atl. 1007 (1915) (Plaintiff engaged in duties
fell while trying to avoid blow aimed at hat by fellow-employee) ; Fishering
v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 690, 158 Pac. 215 (1916) (Toy factory employee posed
before trick camera held by another employee and injured -by the spring it
ejected.) ; Pierce v. Boyer-Van Kuran Co., 99 Neb. 321, 156 N. W. 509 (1916) ;
Payne, Dir. Gen. of Ry. v. Industrial Commission, 295 III. 388, 129 N. E. 122
(1920)'; Federal Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Havolic, 162 Wis. 301, 156 N. W. 143
(1916) ; Washburn's Case, 123 Me. 402, 123 Atl. 180 (1924) ; Hazelwood ct al.
v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 208 Ky. 618, 271 S. W. 687 (1925) ; Stuart v.
Kansas City, 102 Kan. 307, 171 Pac. 913 (1918) ; Ward et at. v. Industrial Acc.
Com. of California, 175 Cal. 42, 164 Pac. 1123 (1917).8 Hulley v. Moosbrugger, Pierce v. Boyer-Van Kuran Co., Stuart v. Kansas
City, Tarpper v. Weston-Mott Co., all mipra note 5.
" Chicago, I. and L. Ry. Co. v. Clendenin, 81 Ind. App. 323, 143 N. E. 303(1924) (Car inspector injured by rock thrown by fellow-employee to frighten
him when it rolled off car.) ; Newport Hydrocarbon Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. of
Wisconsin, 167 Wis. 630, 167 N. W. 749 (1918) (Fellow-workman jokingly
connected electric wire to employee's machine.) ; .Knopp v. American Car and
Foundry Co., 186 Ill. App. 605 (1914) (Employee operating trip hammer in-
jured while trying to remove can from under same, placed there by bystander.) ;
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where the injured person took part in the horseplay, but was attend-
ing to his duties at the same time.8 But this seems as far as any of
the courts have gone in allowing recovery. In the cases of injuries
occasioned through horseplay which was commonly carried on with
the consent or at least the acquiescence of the employer, compen-
sation has been allowed in some instances.9
As said in the instant case, it is practically inevitable that work-
men, even of mature years, will indulge in a moment's diversion from
work to joke with or play a prank on a fellow-workman. Such risks
are incident to business and industry, and grow out of them. The
common law put the burden of such risk upon the employee. But
the compensation acts are designed for the very purpose of eliminat-
ing fault as a basis of liability,10 and to insure the employee against
the ordinary risks of the employment. The burden of proof is upon
the employer to prove that the injury was not caused by risk of the
employment. A very satisfactory rule, which should not tend to
increase horseplay in industry, has been expressed by the Oklahoma
Court. This rule denies compensation to the workman who is in-
jured while indulging in horseplay, but grants it to the workman who
Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 470, 128 N. E. 711 (1920)
(Working employee struck in eye by apple thrown by another employee at a
third.); Industrial Commission v. Weigandt, 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N. E. 38
(1921) (Employee struck in eye by file which flew from its handle during a
scuffle between other employees.); Boyce v. Burleigh, 112 Neb. 509, 199 N. W.
785 (1924) (Employer kept gun to shoot pigeons. Employee shot by acci-
dental discharge of the weapon in the hands of a fellow-employee.) ; Pekin
Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Board, 277 Ill. 53, 115 N. E. 128 (1917) (Employee
standing in line to receive check thrown down and injured by horseplay on the
part of other employees.) ; Hollenbach v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S. W.
152 (1918) (Employee killed by live wire run to washbasin for horseplay.) ;
Markel v. Daniel Green Felt Co., 221 N. Y. 490, 116 N. E. 1060 (1917) ; Socha
v. Packing Co., 105 Neb. 691, 181 N. W. 706 (1921) ; Willis v. State Industrial
Commission, 78 Okla. 216, 190 Pac. 92 (1920); Keen v. New Amsterdam Cas-
ualty Co., 34 Ga. App. 257, 129 S. E. 174 (1925) ; Marland Refining Co. v. Col-
baugh et al., 110 Okla. 238, 238 Pac. 831 (1925) ; May Chevrolet Co. v. Arm-
strong, 82 Ind. App. 547, 146 N. E. 847 (1925).
*Kansas City Fibre Box Co. v. Connell, 5 Fed. (2nd) 398 (1925) (Em-
ployee operating machine, injured while resisting interference by fellow-work-
man, while continuing his duties.); Martin v. Georgia Casualty Co., 30 Ga.
App. 712, 119 S. E. 337 (1923) (Convict guard on duty playfully toyed with
another guard's pistol. Latter, while attempting to readjust same, accidentally
shot first guard.) ; Stark v. State Ind. Commission, 103 Ore. 80, 204 Pac. 151
(1922).
* In re Loper, supra note 4; State v. District Court, 140 Minn. 75, 167
N. W. 283 (1918); White v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 104 Kan. 90, 177
Pac. 522 (1919); Stuart v. Kansas City, supra note 5; Kokomo Steel and
Wire Co. v. Irick, 80 Ind. App. 610, 141 N. E. 796 (1923) ; Glenn v. Reynold's
Spring Co., 225 Mich. 693, 196 N. W. 617, 36 A. L. R. 1464 (1924).
" Chambers v. Oil Co., supra note 2.
